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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j) 
(1953) as amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from final orders of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Tyrone Medley, on March 12, 1998, and on 
January 29, 1999, reentered on February 2, 1999. The January 29, 1999 order is the final 
appealable order in this matter. There were no other motions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Intervenors to intervene 
post-judgment? 
Standard of Review. Abuse of discretion is the proper standard for this issue. Jennerv. 
Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983). 
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend and refusing to enforce the settlement agreement? 
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985) (citing Larson v. Collins, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1984)). 
III. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Intervenors had standing to raise 
all relevant arguments? 
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Standard of Review. This is an issue of standing and consequently should be reviewed 
for correctness. Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. Department of Employment Sec, 878 P.2d 
1191, 1194 (Utah App. 1994). 
IV. Whether the Lis Pendens was effective to impart constructive notice to 
Intervenors where Plaintiffs Complaint was silent regarding the Utah County property? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. Johnson 
v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein as Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 1, 1995 the Third District Court (hereinafter trial court) entered a final 
judgment and ordered dismissal of plaintiffs First Western Corp. and National Fund, Inc.'s 
(hereinafter Plaintiff) action to recover stolen coins. R.1654, 1656. The trial court dismissed the 
case and rendered judgment based upon a stipulation entered into by Plaintiffs and Defendants. 
Id. On October 21, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend/and or Correct Judgment 
(hereinafter Motion or Motion to Amend). R. 1661. 
On May 27, 1997, John D. Wagner and Lincoln Service Corporation (hereinafter 
Intervenors) learned of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend through a separate pleading which Plaintiff 
filed in the Fourth District Court, Utah County. R.2026, 2029. It was at this time that 
Intervenors first learned of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend (nearly eight months after Plaintiff filed 
the Motion). Id. Intervenors then filed a Motion to Intervene in the Third District Court action. 
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R. 1718, 1745, 1885. The Third District Court denied Intervenors' initial motion. Id. 
Intervenors then filed a Motion to Reconsider the Motion to Intervene. R.2332, 2340. On March 
12, 1998 the trial court granted Intervenors' Motion to Intervene and Intervenors then filed a 
Motion in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. Id. 
On January 29,1999 the trial court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
order which denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. R.2524, 2540. Plaintiffs appeal the trial 
court's March 12, 1998 order granting leave to intervene and the trial court's January 29, 1999 
order. R.2562. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Intervenors to intervene. 
Intervenors satisfied all necessary requirements as set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) 
and as interpreted in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982). Intervenors timely filed their 
Motion to Intervene by showing substantial prejudice and strong justification. Intervenors 
showed they had an interest in the litigation and that their interests were not adequately 
represented by the existing parties. Finally, Intervenors would have been bound by the Third 
District Court judgment. Intervenors, therefore, met all intervention requirements 
Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend and enforce the settlement agreement. The alleged settlement agreement would have 
conveyed an interest in land; however, the agreement violated the Statute of Frauds, would have 
harmed a bona fide purchaser for value, and would have been impossible to enforce. The trial 
court also properly denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. Plaintiffs Motion was not to correct a 
"clerical" mistake or error, rather, it sought a substantive modification of a valid money 
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judgment. Further, Plaintiff did not timely file the motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Plaintiffs Motion would have affected the Trustees of the 
Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust but the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over 
them; nor did the trial court have in rem jurisdiction over the Utah County property which the 
Amendment would have affected. 
Next, the trial court correctly allowed Intervenors to raise all relevant defenses to protect 
their property interests. Intervenors had standing because they showed: 1) a distinct and palpable 
injury, 2) that they had the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation, and 3) that the 
critical issues affecting their interests would not have been raised. Intervenors had standing. 
Finally, the trial court correctly ruled that the Lis Pendens was ineffective to put 
Intervenors on notice of the pending litigation. Plaintiffs Complaint did not mention the Utah 
County property. A lis pendens has no independent legal significance, it is a republication of the 
pleadings, and Plaintiff did not "publish" in the pleadings an interest in the Utah County 
property. As a result, Intervenors had no notice of the litigation. Because they had no notice of 
the litigation, they are protected by the Utah recording statute which protects bona fide 
purchasers for value. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE MOTION TO INTERVENE 
The trial court properly allowed Wagner, Lincoln and Mountain West (hereinafter 
referred to as "Intervenors") to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (hereinafter Rule 24(a)). Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing the intervention. Intervenors petitioned to intervene as a matter 
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of right pursuant to Rule 24 (a) which provides in relevant part: 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: 
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
All parties agree that the correct interpretation of this statute is found in Lima v. Chambers, 
Supra. In Lima, the court concluded that there are four requirements a party must satisfy in order 
to intervene as a matter of right: 1) the intervention application must be timely, 2) the applicant 
must have an interest in the subject matter of the dispute, 3) the interest(s) of the applicant is(are) 
or may be inadequately represented, and 4) the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action. Id. at 282. 
In this case, Plaintiffs received a money judgment on December 1, 1995 in the amount of 
$200,000 entered against the "Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust." R.1654. Nearly eleven 
months after the trial court entered judgment and dismissed the case Plaintiffs filed a Motion to 
Amend the judgment. It is this Motion to Amend which prompted Intervenors to intervene. The 
remainder of section I will show that Intervenors satisfied all four intervention requirements and 
that the trial court properly granted the motion to intervene. 
A. The Intervenors Timely Filed the Motion to Intervene 
Intervenors timely filed their motion to intervene. Timeliness of an intervention motion 
is a discretionary question left to the trial judge. See Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 
1072,1073-74 (Utah 1983). In Jenner the Utah Supreme Court explained that the court's 
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discretion extends to an investigation of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. 
Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion by examining the facts and circumstances of this 
particular case to determine that Intervenors timely moved for intervention. Although Jenner 
states that courts are reluctant to grant post-judgment intervention motions, it also states that 
post-judgment intervention is proper when an intervenor can show substantial prejudice and 
either one of the following: 1) a strong showing of entitlement or justification or 2) such unusual 
and compelling circumstances as will justify failure to seek intervention earlier. Intervenors 
showed a substantial prejudice and a strong showing of justification. 
1. Substantial Prejudice 
Intervenors showed substantial prejudice by demonstrating that the effect of denying the 
Motion to Intervene would have left the Utah County property subject to divestment. This is 
substantial prejudice and satisfies the first part of the Jenner test. 
2. Strong Showing of Entitlement of Justification 
Intervenors also satisfied the second part of the Jenner test by showing a strong 
entitlement or justification to intervene post-judgment. The justification for a post-judgment 
intervention is based on the effect Plaintiffs Motion to Amend would have had on the 
Intervenors' Utah County property. As mentioned above, the effect would have been total 
divestment of the Utah County property. 
In addition, Intervenors made a strong showing of entitlement or justification in the 
following ways: 1) prior to the intervention, there were no parties present in the litigation to 
protect the Intervenor's interests because the original Defendants had no interest in the Utah 
County property (see section II.A.3 below); 2) nowhere in the Third Amended Complaint did the 
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Plaintiffs specifically describe the Utah County property and thus the Intervenors could not have 
known that their particular tract was the subject of litigation; 3) because of reason #2 above, the 
Lis Pendens was void and did not give constructive notice to the Intervenors (see section IV 
below); 4) in effect, Plaintiffs sought a judgment against Intervenors when they were not parties 
to the litigation; and finally 5) Plaintiff moved to amend eleven months after entry of final 
judgment and dismissal of the case, far beyond the ten (10) days provided for under Rule 59 (e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For the above mentioned reasons, Intervenors made a 
strong showing of entitlement or justification for a post-judgment intervention as required by 
Jenner. 
In sum, the trial court has discretion to examine the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case to determine whether the motion to intervene is timely. There is no evidence that 
the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Intervenors moved timely to intervene. 
On the contrary, the record clearly indicates a strong showing of justification and entitlement to 
allow the post-judgment intervention. 
B. Intervenors Had an Interest in The Subject Matter in Dispute 
The second requirement for a Rule 24(a) intervention is that the applicant must show an 
interest in the subject matter in dispute. See Lima at 282. When Plaintiff moved to amend the 
judgment, the Utah County property became a matter in dispute. Plaintiff cannot now claim that 
Intervenors have no interest in the subject matter when they voluntarily put it in dispute. For this 
reason, the second requirement under Lima is satisfied. 
C. Intervenors' Interest Were Inadequately Represented 
The third Lima requirement is to determine whether the intervening party's interests are 
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adequately represented. If the interests are inadequately represented, the motion to intervene 
should be granted. 
At the time of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend, no party to the litigation had an interest in the 
Utah County property. Defendants had no interest in the Utah County property because they sold 
it. This conveyance stripped them of any motivation to represent Intervenors' interests. 
Plaintiff apparently agrees. Plaintiff admitted that the proposed change from a money judgment 
to a judgment affecting title " . . . in no way economically impacts the Defendants." R. 1693. 
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that the Trustees of the "Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable 
Trust" represented the interests of Intervenors. The trustees were not parties to the litigation. In 
fact, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend seeks to add the trustees as parties to the lawsuit. 
In sum, there were no parties representing the interests of Intervenors prior to the granting 
of the post-judgment intervention. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
granting the motion to intervene. The third requirement of Lima is satisfied. 
D. Intervenors Would Have Been Bound by a Judgment 
The final requirement for a Rule 24(a) intervention is that the intervening parties be 
bound by the judgment. In this case it is clear that the Motion to Amend would have bound the 
Intervenors. If the Motion would have been granted in the absence of Intervenors, they would 
have lost their property. This clearly binds Intervenors as required for Rule 24(a) intervention. 
In conclusion, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) a party has a right to 
intervene if four requirements are satisfied. See Lima, Supra. In this case, Intervenors met all 
four requirements. Further, the standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. See 
Jenner, Supra. There is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
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post-judgment intervention. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted 
the post-judgment motion to intervene. 
II. THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
The trial court properly refused to enforce the settlement agreement and amend the 
judgment. Such changes to the judgment would have wrongfully divested Intervenors of title to 
the Utah County property. The standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. Corbett, 
Supra. A reiteration of some background information is helpful to understand this Motion. 
This case commenced on March 19, 1991. R.l. In 1995, the original parties began 
settlement negotiations and on May 18, 1995 Plaintiffs made a settlement offer. R.2172. Shortly 
before the case was scheduled to go to trial, the parties reached a settlement. R.2173-73. The 
settlement, entered into by the original Defendants and Plaintiff, called for amendments to the 
judgment in order to facilitate collection by Plaintiff. R.2173. Following this stipulation, the 
trial court entered judgment on December 1, 1995 and dismissed the case with prejudice. 
R. 1654. On October 21, 1996 Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend. R. 1661. It is this Motion to 
Amend which will now be discussed. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend seeks two remedies: First, to specifically enforce the 
settlement agreement. Second, to change the judgment debtor from Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable 
Family Trust to the trustees of said Trust. Part A of this section will address why the trial court 
properly refused to enforce the settlement agreement. Part B will address why the trial court 
properly determined that Plaintiff did not timely file the Motion to Amend. Part C will show that 
the trial court properly refused to modify the Judgment to include the Trustees as judgment 
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debtors because it did not have In Personam jurisdiction over them. Finally, Part D will show 
that the trial court did not have in rem jurisdiction over the Utah County property and thus could 
not amend the judgment to transfer title to Plaintiffs. As a whole this section will demonstrate 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend. Any one of the arguments, standing alone, is sufficient to demonstrate that the trial 
court correctly declined to grant Plaintiffs Motion. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Enforce the Settlement Agreement 
Plaintiffs seek to enforce an alleged stipulated settlement agreement whereby Plaintiff 
would have unilateral power to fundamentally alter the judgment from a money judgment to a 
judgment giving Plaintiff title to real property located in Utah County. The agreement should 
not be enforced because: 1) it violates the Statute of Frauds, 2) Intervenors are Bona Fide 
Purchasers for value, 3) Even if the stipulation was valid at the time of judgment, Defendants no 
longer had a property interest to transfer, and 4) Intervenors were not parties to the agreement. 
1. The Alleged Stipulated Settlement Agreement Violates the Statute of Frauds 
The settlement agreement cannot be enforced because it violates the Statute of Frauds. 
While it is true that Utah courts generally favor enforcement of settlement agreements, this is not 
always the case. It is not true in this case because this case presents unusual circumstances. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is a basic and long established principal of contract law that agreements are 
enforceable, even though there is neither a written memorialization of that 
agreement nor the signature of the parties, unless specifically required by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
Appellant's brief, p. 25 (citing Murray v. State, 111 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979)) (emphasis 
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added). Thus, if the Statute of Frauds is implicated, the settlement agreement must be in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1(1999) reads in relevant part: "[n]o estate or interest in real property... 
shall be... surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party... surrendering or declaring the same." In other 
words, if an "estate or interest in real property" is transferred, the conveying instrument must be 
signed by the party surrendering the estate or interest. Id. In this case, the effect of the 
agreement would be to transfer title to Plaintiff; however, there is no signed writing. The Statute 
of Frauds prevents the relief sought by Plaintiff and therefore the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
2. Enforcement of the Agreement Would Harm a Bona Fide Purchaser 
In addition to violating the Statute of Frauds, this the trial court properly declined to 
enforce this agreement because Intervenors are bona fide purchasers for value (BFP). As such 
they properly received protection from the Motion to Amend. The Motion to Amend will 
effectively strip Intervenors of their interest in the Utah County property despite the fact that they 
took title in good faith, for value and without notice of any defect in title. The Utah Supreme 
Court defined a BFP as one who acts in good faith, pays value and " . . . one who takes without 
actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice of the complainant's 
equity." Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). In the present action, Intervenors 
have at all times acted in good faith, Mr Wagner paid $122,000 and had no actual or constructive 
notice of potential title problems with the Utah County property. Furthermore, the Lis Pendens 
filed shortly before Wagner purchased the property was ineffective to put him on notice of 
pending litigation involving the subject property (see section IV). The trial court agreed, and on 
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February 17, 1998, ruled that the Lis Pendens did not give Intervenors notice of the pending 
litigation: 
[i]n this particular case the third amended complaint, face of the pleading, seeks a 
money judgment. Therefore, the lis pendens is not effective to impart the type of 
notice that require the intervenors to act. 
R.2338. The result: Intervenors are protected against Plaintiffs claim to Utah County property. 
See Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993) (BFP's interest is not affected by 
subsequent claimant's execution on the property). 
In sum, granting of Plaintiff s motion to Amend and enforcement of the settlement 
agreement would divest Intervenors of title and would destroy Intervenor's status as BFP. In 
reaching this decision, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
3. Even Assuming the Stipulation was Valid, Amending the Judgment Would be Futile 
Because Defendants no Longer Have an Interest to Transfer 
The third reason the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs Motion 
is that an amendment would be impossible for Defendants to comply with. It would be because 
Defendants no longer have any interest to transfer to Plaintiff. Prior to entry of judgment, 
Defendants sold the property to Intervenors and no longer have any right or interest in the subject 
property. If granted, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend would render Defendant's compliance with the 
judgment impossible. Defendants cannot convey what they do not own. In fact, the Utah 
Supreme Court has spoken to this issue in Corbettf. Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985). 
Corbett involved various real estate transactions and various parties regarding property in Cedar 
Valley, Utah. Id. at 385. The plaintiffs in the original action appealed judgments in favor of two 
defendants (Defendants II). Id. Both appeals were dismissed with prejudice. The original 
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judgment called for a reconveyance rather than money damages. Id. Subsequent to the court's 
dismissal, two of Defendants II brought before the court an order to show cause why the original 
judgment should not be amended and corrected to enter an award of money damages rather than 
reconveyance. Id. Defendants II argued that the real property could not be reconveyed because 
the plaintiff had disposed of the property to third parties. Id. The trial court reversed its original 
order of reconveyance because Plaintiffs could no longer reconvey. The Supreme Court 
affirmed. Id. at 386. The Court stated: 
The original judgment ordered reconveyance of the real properties at issue. Since 
those properties had been disposed by the plaintiffs to third parties, making it 
impossible for the plaintiffs to comply, an amendment of the original judgment... 
allowing money damages, rather than reconveyance, was appropriate. 
Id at 385. 
Like Corbett this case presents a situation where conveyance is impossible. Defendants 
no longer own the property and thus cannot convey it to Plaintiffs. Here, like Corbett, money 
damages is the only remedy available to Plaintiff from Defendant. 
4. Interveners Were not "Parties" to the Settlement Agreement 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by not refusing to enforce the settlement 
agreement. Plaintiff relies on Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 
(Utah 1979) for the proposition that "[settlements are favored and even encouraged because of 
the obvious benefits to the parties, as well as the judicial system. Appellants Brief, p. 25 
(emphasis added). Intervenors agree. However, Plaintiff fails to point out that Intervenors are 
not "parties." Intervenors were not parties to the settlement agreement and thus reliance on 
Tracy Collins Bank is without merit. Further, it is a stretch to argue that it is beneficial to the 
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judicial system to divest a BFP of an interest in land by enforcing an unsigned settlement 
agreement that the BFP had no part in making. Plaintiffs reliance on Tracy Collins Bank has no 
merit. 
To summarize section II.A, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 
enforce the settlement agreeement. First, the agreement violated the Statute of Frauds. Second, 
enforcement would have harmed a BFP. Third, the agreement would be impossible for 
Defendants to comply with. Fourth, Intervenors were not parties to the agreement. 
B. Plaintiff did not Timely File Motion to Amend and Therefore the Trial Court 
Lacked Jurisdiction to Hear Plaintiffs Motion 
Plaintiff sought to Amend the trial court's judgment entered on December 1, 1995. 
R.1654. Plaintiffs filed this Motion on October 21, 1996, nearly eleven months after the trial 
court entered judgment. R.1661. The trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend was not proper under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a) (hereinafter Rule 60(a)) and 
that the Motion was untimely under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) (hereinafter Rule 
59(e)). Section B.l will discuss Rule 60(a). Section B.2 will discuss Rule 59(e). 
1. Rule 60(a) is not Applicable to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend 
It is Plaintiffs contention that the Motion to Amend was proper under Rule 60(a) despite 
the fact that eleven (11) months passed between the time of final judgment and the filing of the 
motion. Rule 60(a) reads: 
Clerical mistakes in judgment, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. 
Plaintiffs Motion did not seek to correct an "clerical" mistake or omission; Plaintiff sought to 
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m a k e a s u b s t a n t i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n a n d t h u s R u l e 6 0 ( a ) w a s n o t the proper b a s i s for P l a i n t i f f s 
M o t i o n . 
a. I l i i i i i t i l l ' s [\ In I in (in illliiiill iiiiiiiill SHITI I i l> II < n II nil \ mi "I II in i (Mi I"1 1^  I i s lu l i HI 'IIIIIII siiiiiii 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what constitutes a "clerical" mistake 
or error. In Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins., 669 P.2d 1201 (I Jtah 1983) the Court stated 
that a clerical n listake i mdei R \ lie 60(a) is li"1" a t> pe of i nistake or omission mechanical ii I 
nature which is apparent on the record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment 
by an attorney." Id at 1206 (c iting In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp, 266 F Supp 605, 607 
(1967); See also Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) ("[t]he distinction between a 
judicial error and a clerical error does not depend on who made it. Rather, it depends on whether 
it was made m rendering the ji ldgment oi in recording the ji idgment rendered") In Stangei • t h e 
"mechanical" mistake involved a miscalculation of numbers. This mistake, the Supreme Court 
noted, was apparent from the record and the Court remanded the case simply to correct the 
calci ilation I he case at hand does not present si ich a "clei ical "' mistake. 
In this case, Plaintiffs sought a money judgment and the trial court granted that money 
judgment. The trial court did not make a scrivener's error; it gave Plaintiff exactly what Plaintiff 
wanted - a mone> judgment. Plaintiffs decision to pursue a money judgment as opposed to an 
interest in real property is a substantive legal decision, a decision to which Rule 60(a) does not 
apply. See Bi in i, , W 'hitmit c " 956 F 2d 509 (5th Cir 1992) (i tile governing clerical mistakes does 
not apply to a motion seeking to correct an error of substantive judgment that affects the 
substantive rights of a party). 
Plaintiff 1: lad an opportunity to inch ide ai l interest ii t the I Jtah Con n it) propei !:> pi ic i to 
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final judgment. In fact, several proposed judgment drafts were negotiated by the original parties 
before deciding on the wording found in the final judgment. R. 1669-1700. Rule 60(a) is not a 
proper basis for Plaintiff to now attempt to "back door" an interest in the property. Because Rule 
60(a) is not a proper basis for Plaintiffs motion, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
motion under the rule. Plaintiffs Motion did not seek to correct a "clerical" mistake. 
b. Plaintiffs Motion Sought to Make a Substantive Modification of the Judgment 
In reality, and as alluded to in section B.l .a, Plaintiffs Motion sought a substantive 
modification to the final judgment. Plaintiff sought to convert a money judgment to a judgment 
that would give Plaintiff an interest in real property. To this end, a motion under Rule 60(a) is 
not proper. The Utah Court of Appeals addressed this question in State v. Moya 815 P.2d 1312, 
(Utah App. 1991). In Moya, the Court, in dicta, stated: "[s]ubstantive modifications to address 
subsequent developments are not authorized under Rule 60(a)." Id. at 1317. The defendant in 
Moya sought to revise the wording of a sentence in the judgment. The court noted that Rule 
60(a) was not the proper basis for such an amendment. Id. See also Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 
401, 402 (Utah 1984) (Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a substantial nature 
particularly where the error is unilateral). Plaintiffs Motion sought to make a substantive 
modification. This modification is not a proper subject matter for a Rule 60(a) motion. 
In conclusion, Rule 60(a) only applies to "clerical" errors. Plaintiffs Motion did not seek 
to modify such an error; in fact, Plaintiff sought to make a substantive modification of the 
judgment giving Plaintiff a property interest in the Utah County property. Thus, the trial court 
correctly ruled that Rule 60(a) was not a proper basis for Plaintiffs motion. 
2. Plaintiff did not Timely File Motion under Rule 59(e) 
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Plaintiff did not t imely file Mot ion to A m e n d within the ten (10) days prescribed by Rule 
59(e). Rule 59(e) reads: 
59(e). Mot ion to alter or amend judgment . A mot ion to alter or amend the judgn lei it 
shall be served not later than ten (10) days after entry of the judgment . 
Plaintiff filed Mot ion to A m e n d nearly eleven (11) months after entry of final judgment . R.1654, 
16 ' ; 1 i Maintiff was clearly beyond the ten (10) days allowed under the Rule and therefore the 
«• • . uuii s Motion under Rule 59(e). 
To summarize, the trial court correctly concluded that Rule 60(a) was not a proper basis 
for Plaintiffs Motion because Plaintiff did not seek to modify a "clerical" mistake In additioi I, 
Plaintiff missed the ten (10) day filing deadline prescribed by Rule 59(e). For the foregoing 
reasons, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs motion to amend. 
C. rhe Trial Court did not Have In Personam Jurisdiction Over Trustees and 
rherefore it Could not Amend Judgment to Include Trustees as Judgment Debtors 
This section will continue to show that the trial court correctly refused to enforce the 
settlement agreement and to amend the judgment. 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Trustees and therefore could not alter the 
judgment to affect them. Plaintiffs never served Scott W. Collard or Christine C. Lewis as 
I rusteesof the Ii ilic C I h< >mas Irrev < >a ible I 'amily I i i ist il R 1006 1008 1009, 1011 lit . ti ic 
the Third Amended Compla in t named Scott W. Collard and Christine C. Lewis in their 
individual capacity, not trustees. R .965 . In addition, Plaintiff named as defendant "The Julie C. 
Plaintiffs served Scott Collard as "agent" for the Trust. R. 1014 \.n agency is a relationship between two 
persons. A trust is not a natural or artificial person; rather, a trust is a property interest incapable of holding title to 
real property. See Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1983) (trust is not an entity capable of holding title 
to real estate). Thus, it is not possible for a trust to have an agent. If the trust cannot have an agent, then Plaintiffs 
service on Scott Collard as "agent" of the trust is ineffective as service upon Scott Collard as "Trustee." 
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Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust." Id. Further, the record is silent regarding any pleadings, 
appearances, or motions filed by trustees in their capacity as trustees. Plaintiffs fundamental 
failure to name the trustees as defendants resulted in the trial court's inability exercise 
jurisdiction over the Trustees. See Price v. Dean, 990 S.W.2d 453, 454-55 (Tex.App. 1999) 
(trustee never served in her capacity as trustee and trust not named as defendant; therefore, the 
court did not acquire jurisdiction over trustee). 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), personal service must be made: 
. . . by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to the individual 
personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place 
of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by 
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process. 
Plaintiff must serve process on each defendant. Without service, a court has no jurisdiction over 
individuals. 62B Am.Jur.2d Process § 4 (1990). Here, Plaintiffs failure to serve Trustees is 
fatal because it meant the trial court never had jurisdiction over them. See Murdoch v. Blake, 484 
P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971) ("[t]he proper issuance and service of summons is the means of 
invoking the jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant..."); See 
also Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) (the requirements of Rule 4 relating to service 
of process are jurisdictional). The remedies sought by Plaintiff cannot be granted without in 
personam jurisdiction over Trustees and therefore the trial court never had in personam 
jurisdiction over Trustees. 
Plaintiff sought first to specifically enforce a settlement which against Trustees. Plaintiff 
also sought to collect a $200,000 judgment against Trustees. In order for the court to grant either 
remedy, it must have had personal jurisdiction over Trustees. Because Plaintiff failed to name 
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Trustees as defendants and serve them with process, the trial court never had jurisdiction over 
them. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs requests. 
D, I  he Trial Court did not Have In rem Jurisdiction Over the Utah County Property 
md Therefore it Could not Amend the Judgment to Transfer Title to Plaintiffs 
The fourth reason why the trial court properly refused to grant Plaintiffs Motion is that 
the trial court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the Utah County property. Plaintiff did not mention 
in the pleadings the Utah County property and as a resi lit, the trial coi u t coi ilcl i lot ha\ e had « 
rem jurisdiction over the property. 
1. Plaintiff Made no Allegations Regarding Utah County Property in Complaint 
Plaintiff did not assert an interest in the Utah County property in the Third Amended 
Complaint (Complaint). In Plaintiffs seventh claim for relief, Plaintiff asks that" . . . a 
consti i :::()! porate assets to prevent r h o m a s ' improper i lse of 
the assets ," and that the c o u r t " . . .should determine the true ownership of said assets and deduce 
that they are subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiffs." R.976. This reference to 
to the gold coins stolen by defendants. R .971 . Further, in Pla in t i f f s prayer for relief, paragraph 
l», Plaintiff seeks: 
For Judgment on Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief against Defendant Kelly 
Thomas for damages in the amount to be proven at trial, but in any case at least 
$850,000 plus punit ive damages in the sum of $1,000,000.00. 
Again. 
Plaintiff had a duty to plead and prove his cause of action. In order to do that, the 
pleadings must set forth all claims and all remedies. In addition, the facts and legal theories must 
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be stated with reasonable definiteness, certainty and clarity. 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleadings § 113 
(1999). Plaintiff did not mention real property and because Plaintiff failed to do this, the trial 
court had no jurisdiction over the real property. 
2. Judgment Must be Supported by Pleadings or it is Void 
Because plaintiffs pleadings failed to assert an interest in the Utah County property, an 
amendment giving Plaintiff an interest in the property cannot be supported. A judgment must be 
supported by the pleadings. 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleadings § 3 (1999). The pleadings must contain a 
proper basis for subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Id. In fact, a party may not be granted 
relief in the absence of proper pleadings because a judgment based on an issue not pleaded is a 
nullity. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 2 (1994). As mentioned in II.D.l, Plaintiff did not plead an 
interest in any real property. Therefore, a judgment giving Plaintiff an interest in real property is 
a "nullity." 
Furthermore, Plaintiff is not entitled an interest in the real property under Rule 8(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule reads: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; 
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief which he deems himself entitled. 
Plaintiff failed to satisfy this rule. Section (a)(1) requires Plaintiff to include a plain statement of 
all claims to which he is entitled. Plaintiff never asserted that he is entitled to relief by way of 
title to real property. Section (a)(2) is a correlative to (a)(1) in that it requires the claims in (a)(1) 
to have a corresponding demand for judgment. Again, Plaintiff sought only money damages. 
Plaintiffs pleading is not sufficient to support the relief he now seeks. 
In sum, the Complaint is silent regarding real property. As a result of this silence, 
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Plaintiffs request for an Amendment cannot be supported because it was insufficient to grant the 
trial court jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Plaintiff "s Moti< n i 
III. FHE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HEARD INTERVENORS' DEFENSES 
BECAUSE INTERVENORS HAD STANDING TO MAKE THE DEFENSES 
I he third issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court proper n .*M 
Intervenors' defenses. 
Intervenors had standing to assail the Plaintiffs motion. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Terrai •< * v. I Hah Be /. OfStah • L v ids & Forestry, 716 I > 2d 796, 799 (I Itah 1/986) gi\ es us tl: le test 
for standing: 
The first general criterion is that the 'plaintiff must be able to show that he has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute'... Second, it a plaintiff does not have standing 
under the first criterion, he may have standing if no one else has a greater interest 
in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that 
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue. 
1 1 ins Ii iter v ei lors i ni ist si low eitl ler 1) a distinct inji u ;; ' 1:1 lat gi\ 'es them a personal stake in tl le 
outcome of the dispute, or 2) no one else has a greater interest in the outcome and the issues are 
unlikely to be raised by the existing parties. Intervenors satisfied both criteria. The remainder of 
this section w ill show: A) tl: lat 1 < m i< :*< v applies to a 60(a) i i lotion, B) Inter v enoi s satisfied both 
Terracor criteria, C) Intervenors had standing to assert all relevant defenses, and D) the case law 
relied upo Maintiff is not ~- • :. . In its entirety,, this set i •* ; : 
Intervenors had standing. The standard of review for this issue is correctness. See Aldrich, 
Nelson, Weight, &Esplinv. Department of Employment Sec, 878 P.2d 1191 (UtahApp. 1994). 
A. 
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The test in Terracor has been applied by Utah courts to determine whether a party had 
standing to object to a motion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). See Blodgett v. Zions 
First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1988) (a party lacked standing to object to a Rule 
60(a) motion); See also Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990) (test applied to a 
determine whether a defendant had standing to raise a statute of frauds defense even though he 
had no interest in the subject real property). Thus, Terracor is the proper test to determine 
standing to raise arguments at a 60(a) motion hearing. 
B. Intervenors Showed Distinct and Palpable Injury That Gave Them a Personal Stake 
in the Outcome of the Litigation 
Intervenors showed a distinct injury. The injury was a loss of property. As stated earlier, 
Intervenors were the only parties, other than Plaintiffs, who had an interest in the Utah County 
property. Defendants conveyed the Utah County property to Intervenors thus divesting their 
interest in the property. By virtue of this conveyance, no existing parties to the litigation had a 
personal stake in the Utah County property. Therefore, Intervenors showed distinct injury that 
gave them a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. This satisfies the first part of 
Terracor. 
C. Intervenors Had The Greatest Interest in The Outcome of The Motion to Amend 
and The Issues May Not Have Been Raised by Other Parties to The Lawsuit 
If Intervenors were not successful in proving part one of Terracor, in the alternative, they 
could also prove that they had the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation and that the 
issues may not have been raised in their absence (the term "litigation" refers to the Motion to 
Amend). This is the second alternative found in Terracor. As mentioned above, the Intervenors 
would lose title to their property if the trial court granted the Motion. No other party to the 
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lawsuit had a greater interest than that. The Defendants had no interest in the Utah County 
property because they conveyed the property to Intervenors. Therefore, no one, other than 
Plan itiff, had ai :t ii itei est ii 1 the I Itah Coi inty proper ty 
In sum, Intervenors had the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation and no other 
party to the litigation would have had a reason to protect Intervenors interests. Intervenors, 
therefore', had standing to cl lallenge the ai nendn lent to the judgment 
Intervenors Had Standing to Raise all Relevant Arguments to Protect Their 
Interests 
I ;inall> I laintiffs assei t that It iter venors had t 10 standing to assert certain defenses. 
Appellants Brief, p. 22. However, In Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 135 P. 103 (Utah 1913) 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of which arguments a party may raise. The 
interest in the real estate " . . . may assail a judgment, deed, or any other instrument affecting his 
title for the reason that such judgment or instruments are void, upon the ground of fraud or for 
any other legal reason."" ia. ai 105 (emphasis added) I hi is accordii lg to Doyt e a pai 1:> that 
wishes to protect a property interest may raise "any legal reason." Therefore, the trial court 
pi opei 1> heard Intervenors' arguments. 
E. Plaintiffs Case Law is Not Controlling For This Issue 
Plaintiff relies upon Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. Department of Employment Sec. 
878 P 2d 1191 (I Ital I 1994) a s si ippoi t, foi ti le proposition tl lat Intervenors 1 lad no standing to 
raise certain arguments. However, this case is distinguishable from the present case. In Aldrich, 
the petitioner was a law firm that appealed a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial 
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Commission of Utah (Board) limiting attorneys fees to 25% of the recovery. The petitioner/law 
firm argued that the Board's decision to limit attorney's fees denied his client due process. The 
Court concluded that while the petitioner had a personal stake in receiving attorney's fees, 
"[ajldrich (petitioner) does not have a personal stake in whether Mr. Karbakhsh's (client) due 
process rights were violated." Aldrich at 1194 (parentheticals added). Thus, in Aldrich there 
were other parties with a more personal stake in the outcome, namely the petitioner's client. 
However, in this case, there was no other party that had a greater interest in the outcome than the 
Intervenors. No one had more incentive than Intervenors to raise the issues. Aldrich is not 
controlling. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992) is also misguided. 
Plaintiff claims that the Lis Pendens deprived Intervenors of standing. However, Shelledy is 
factually distinguishable from the present action. In Shelledy, the Plaintiff, purchased property 
from a federal agency. The property was subject to a tax deed because of delinquent taxes in 
1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983. While the Plaintiff did not challenge the 1978 and 1980 
assessments, he argued that because the federal government is exempt from taxation from a 
sovereign state, the 1981-83 assessments were invalid. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that 
the Plaintiff lacked standing to assert the sovereign immunity defense because he was on "record 
notice" of defendant's sheriff deed at the time he took title. Id. At 790. In the present case, 
Intervenors had no constructive notice of the defendant's rival claim to the property. In fact, 
Intervenors had no actual notice until May 27, 1997 when they learned of Plaintiff s Motion to 
Amend. Shelledy turned on notice and because Intervenors had no notice of a rival claim to the 
property, Shelledy is not controlling on the issue of standing. 
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Iii conclusion, Intervenors had standing. Intervenors satisfied the Terracor criteria by 
demonstrating that this litigation would injure them distinctly and that they had the greatest 
interest in tl le 01 ltcoi i le of tl le litigation Fi n thei i i lore Interv ei lors had a sen u id legal basis tc • raise 
any relevant arguments in an effort to protect their interests. 
IV. THE LIS PENDENS WAS NOT EFFECTIVE TO PUT WAGNER ON 
N O T I C E AND THIIS WAGNER W A S A BONA FIDE PURCHASER 
The fourth and final issue raised by Appellant is whether the Lis Pendens put Intervenors 
on constructive notice that the Utah County property was the subject of litigation. 
Oi i October 23 1992 I ""laii itiffs filed a lis pendens (hereinafter I -is Pendens' ) ii i the I Jtal I 
County Recorder's office which described the Utah County property. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, p.3. Shortly thereafter, Christine C. Lewis and Scott W. Collard, 
tn istees of the Ji ilie C I homas Irre\ ocable Fai nil} I i i ist c :)i ive> eel the pi operl ) 
Wagner. Id. The parties executed the deed on October 30, 1992 and Wagner recorded the deed 
on November 4, 1992 in order to finance the purchase, Wagner secured a loan for $124,000; 
file loan was secured by a deeu oi* trust recorded on November 4, 1992 Id at 4 1 1 le trial • :• :>n u 1: 
concluded that " Intervenors did not have constructive notice of Plaintiff s claims to the Real 
Propen ;- .• . - Pendens. Id at 10 In addition, the trial court concluded that "Vv agner 
took title to the Utah County property as a Bona Fide Purchaser for value. Id. at 11. 
The remainder of section IV will demonstrate that the trial court correctly ruled that the 
Amended Complaint sought a money judgment only, not title to real property and a lis pendens 
is not valid as to a money judgment; 2) a lis pendens has no independent legal significance; and 
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3) a lis pendens does not give rise to a duty to investigate beyond the pleadings. In the end, 
section IV will show that Wagner was a BFP and the Lis Pendens was not effective to put him on 
notice. 
A. The Third Amended Complaint Only Sought a Money Judgment and a Lis Pendens 
is not Valid as to a Money Judgment 
A lis pendens is not effective with regard to a money judgment and therefore Plaintiffs 
Lis Pendens was not effective. In Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (Complaint), Plaintiffs 
set forth seven claims for relief: 1) conversion by Defendant Thomas, 2) receipt of stolen 
property, 3) concealment of stolen property, 4) conversion by Defendant Beisinger, 5) trespass to 
chattels, 6) breach of fiduciary duty, and 7) constructive trust. It is the seventh claim for relief 
which is in issue here. This claim is found in paragraphs 41 and 41 of the Complaint and reads: 
41. By virtue of the removal of 1st Western Corp. And National Fidelity Inc.'s property, 
a constructive trust should be created over the corporate assets to prevent Thomas' 
improper use of the assets. 
42. The Court should determine the true ownership of said assets and deduce that they 
are subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiff s. 
R.975-76. Nowhere in the Complaint is real property mentioned.2 As stated in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-40-2 (1995) the recording of a lis pendens is authorized only in actions affecting real 
property. This section reads: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right to possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and defendant a the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any 
time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the 
property or some part thereof is situated notice of pendency of the action. . . 
Paragraph G, Prayer for Relief, of Third Amended Complaint Reads: 
G. For Judgment on Plaintiffs Seventh Claim for Relief against Defendant Kelly Thomas 
for damages in the amount to be proven at trial, but in any case, at least $850,000.00 plus 
punitive damages in the sum or $1,000,000.00. 
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(Emphasis added). Plaintiffs did not mention "title to, or the right to possession of, real 
property" in the Complaint. Id. In fact, the Complaint sought a money judgment only.3 Thus, 
the I is I *ei idens \ vas i lot effective to put It iterv enors 01 11 lotice. 
The conclusion that the Lis Pendens in ineffective because the Complaint sought money 
damages only is consistent with a United States District Court, District of Utah decision. T1 
Bushf. Doydi », 1 U 13 R 432 (D. "I Itah 1992) the com t stated that a lis pendens is impropei if the 
complaint seeks only money damages. Judge Benson stated: 
. . . that the filing of a lis pendens was improper in this case. Plaintiff did not 
allege the existence of an equitable lien in his Complaint. The Complaint seeks 
monetary damages only. Utah law does not allow for the filing of lis pendens in 
cases seeking a money judgment. 
Citing Hamilton v. Smith, 808 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (under Utah law civil 
rights plaintiff seeking monetai ;; • damages is restrained froi i i filii ig lis pendens) See also W inters 
v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah App. 1999) (lis pendens invalid because complaint and 
decree did not address title to or possession of real property). The case law supports the 
conclusion that a lis pendens is not effective as to a money judgment. 
In sum, the trial court properly concluded that the Lis Pendens did not impart notice to 
Intervenors because Plaintiffs sought only money damages; the Lis Pendens had no effect. 
B. Lis Pendens has no Independent Legal Significance Apart From Pleadings 
A lis pendens has no significance apart from the pleadings. This simply means that the 
In order to impose a constructive trust over real property, Plaintiff must have specifically identified ific 
real property as the res of the constructive trust. See Amtitle Trust Company v. Fitch, 541 P.2d 1166, 1168 
(Ariz. App. 1975); Aebig v. Commercial Bank of Seattle, 614 P.2d 696, 697 (Wash. App. 1984). 
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to the lis pendens. In Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, (Utah 1979) the Supreme Court of Utah 
held: 
The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to give constructive notice 
of the pendency of the proceeding; its only foundation is the action filed - it has 
no existence independent of it. 
*** 
. . . the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of all the facts 
apparent on the face of the pleadings, the recordation of a notice of lis pendens is, 
in effect, a republication of the pleadings. 
Id. at 190 (emphasis added). This is significant because of the deficiencies in the Third 
Amended Complaint; the Complaint did not mention real property, and therefore the Plaintiffs 
Lis Pendens had no "foundation." Id. The Lis Pendens cannot republish something that was 
never published. See also Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Company, 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978) 
(lis pendens is a republication of the pleadings); See also 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 33 (1987) (a lis 
pendens " . . . is notice of every fact contained in the pleadings or apparent on the face of the 
proceedings... a lis pendens does not extend beyond the prayer for relief). The Lis Pendens 
did not put Intervenors on constructive notice that the Utah County property was a subject of 
litigation. If wagner had no notice, then he was a BFP. If Wagner was a BFP, then he took title 
free of any title defects. 
C. There is no Duty to Investigate Beyond the Face of the Pleadings 
Utah law does not require one to go beyond the pleadings to aggressively investigate 
ambiguities in the pleadings. Thus, Intervenors had no duty to conduct an independent 
investigation to determine whether the oblique reference to "assets" in paragraphs 41 and 42 in 
the Third Amended Complaint referred to the Utah County Property. Utah law imposes on a 
subsequent purchaser for value a requirement to " . . . show that he had no actual notice, i.e., no 
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personal knowledge, of a prior conveyance or that the prior conveyance did not impart 
constructive notice, i.e. was not recorded before his conveyance in the same land was recorded." 
Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings and Loan Assoc 739 P 2d 1133 1136 (I Jtal ) \pp 
1987); See also Utah Code Ann. 57-3-3 (1986). Intervenors produced evidence that they had no 
personal knowledge of pending litigation involving the Utah County property. 
rsified Equities makes clear tl lat the "acti lal notice exc< - • • • \SJSJC?- :' a 
party dealing with the land has information or facts which would put a prudent person upon an 
inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the titk Id j | 11 >6 
icitiiijj lohnstw t" Hell, 666 P.2d 308, j i u ^utah 1983). I hus, a party may be charged with a 
duty to inquire, but such a question is one which turns on questions of fact." J J at -' 
Here, even if these facts suggests that Intervenors should have inquired more, it is :. i' once 
their inquiry began, they would not have discovered anything because there was nothing in the 
pleadings and the trial court's file that mentioned the Utah County property. Finally, Judge 
On ne ii i Divei sifted Equities noted: 
A duty of inquiry requires the party to make inquiry and to diligently do that 
which the answer to the inquiry prompts. . . But a duty to inquire is not a duty to 
disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set straight. 
i(
. isis added) In: i tl le pi esent ca se Intel \ ei lors had it 10 cii it> to "disbelieve" 
the pleadings or to "aggressively investigate." 
In sum, Intervenors acted as like a prudent individual would in this situation ar;. 
law does not require more of them. The effect of their prudence is to make them bona fide 
purchasers for value. If Intervenors are BFPs then the Lis Pendens, filed before the conveyance 
from. Defendants to Intervenors, did not pui ilicin on IN »iia ihut I he pmperts v\us the sub|w t of 
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the litigation. If the Lis Pendens did not put them on notice, then the Lis Pendens had no effect 
on the conveyance to Intervenors. The Lis Pendens was ineffective and Wagner was a BFP. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Intervenors moved 
timely to intervene. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. The trial court also correctly ruled that Intervenors had standing to 
raise all relevant arguments in defense of their interests in the Utah County property. Finally, the 
trial court correctly ruled that the Lis Pendens did not put Intervenors on constructive notice 
regarding the pending litigation. Intervenors respectfully submit that the trial court decision be 
affirmed. 
DATED this^21 day of October, 1999. 
THOMAS W. SEILER (2910) 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, L.C. 
Attorney for Mt. West Title/Appellant 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 
B. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
C. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 
D. Utah Code Annotated 25-5-1 
E. Utah Code Annotated 78-40-2 
F. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) 
G. Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432 (D. Utah 1992) 
H. Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983) 
I. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982) 
J. Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) 
K. State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1991) 
L. Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986) 
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A. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 
7 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 
aside default judgment granted by trial court. (Utah 1984); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 
Bawden & Assocs. v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1988); Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1981). (Utah 1989); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 
Cited in State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
P.2d 604 (1972); State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts within state for purposes of state "closed-door" 
§ 143; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to statute barring unqualified or unregistered 
352; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 8, 9. foreign corporation from local courts — modern 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 54 et seq.; 71 cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 466. 
CJ.S. Pleading §§ 408 to 412; 72 C.J.S. Pro- Key Numbers. — Courts •=> 21 et seq.; 
cess § 3. Pleading *=» 331; Process «=» 4 to 6. 
A.L.R. — What constitutes doing business 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and 
served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the sum-
mons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of 
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely 
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or 
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within 
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or 
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. 
(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the 
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the county in which it is 
brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and 
telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the 
plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time within 
which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and 
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by 
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that 
the complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed 
with the court within ten days of service. 
(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall 
state that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed 
within 10 days after service and shall state the telephone number of the 
clerk of the court where the defendant may call at least 13 days after 
service to determine if the complaint has been filed. 
(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state 
the subject matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and 
that the complaint is on file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this 
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or 
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the 
marshars deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of 
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), 
(3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint 
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons 
and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process; 
B. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 170 
collected through attachment proceeding, of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110,86 P. 805 (1906). ment does not include his personal right to exe-
Vacation of satisfaction. cute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with- (Utah 1974). 
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 1004 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not Rule 606. 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
C. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 178 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
115, 116, 122 to 127. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating civil case where jury has been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion appeal, 38 AX.R.4th 1170. 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set- j ^ ^ ^
 waiVer as binding on later state 
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
 c^vjj ^ ^ j 43 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
 C o u r t ^porter's death or disability prior to 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil ^ ^ 1 ^
 n o t e s as grounds for reversal or 
case, 7 A L.R.3d 1000.
 n e w ^ *, A L R 4 t h 1 0 4 9 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.LR.3d 335 Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
 n e w ^ d Q n d rf ^ ^ 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in
 r , ° , _ ° C A T 1 j . . , 
which they are written, 10 A L.R.3d 501. <£*<* o f d a m a 8 e s ~ m o d e r n c a 8 e 8 > 5 A-L-R5th 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by „" ,
 r 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
 J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference m a n m actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
A.L.R.3d 1101. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. der Federal Employer8, Liability Act (45 USCS 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 189. 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- Key Numbers. — New Trial *» 13 et seq., 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 HO, 116. 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 590)); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
D. Utah Code Annotated 25-5-1 
FRAUD ~AUmu~x 
.jlishment
 a n d enhancement of non-
ldlife management areas that are man-
with Section 23-14-18; 
ad ecosystem research; and 
ration, development, and promotion of the 
a the sale of Wildlife Heritage certificates 
ergency feeding of wildlife. 1993 
. Heritage Account — Contents — Use 
[ monies. 
ited a restricted account within the General 
te Wildlife Heritage Account. 
s of the account shall consist of: 
» from the sale of Wildlife Heritage certifi-
e s received for the Wildlife Heritage pro-
t accrued on account monies. 
the account shall be used as provided in 
fe Board shall report to the 1994 Legislature 
j and programs developed. 1993 
TITLE 24 
STRY AND FIRE CONTROL 
[REPEALED] 
TITLE 25 
FRAUD 
*nt Conveyances [Repealed]. 
lerchandise in Bulk [Repealed!. 
nd Sales of Livestock [Repealed]. 
Qg Wool [Repealed]. 
of Frauds. 
1 Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
3ULENT CONVEYANCES [REPEALED] 
-1-16. Repealed. 1988 
CHAPTER 2 
F MERCHANDISE IN BULK [REPEALED] 
5-2-5. Repealed . 1965 
CHAPTER 3 
i AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK [REPEALED] 
25-3-4. Repealed . 1965 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL [REPEALED] 
25-4-3. Repealed. 1965 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Estate or interest in real property. 
Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
Section 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — 
When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for 
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, grant-
ing, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 1953 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of 
a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and 
testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or being 
extinguished by implication or operation of law. 1995 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall 
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 1953 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and 
signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making of the agree-
ment; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another; 
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made 
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises 
to marry; 
(4) every special promise made by an executor or ad-
ministrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to 
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own 
estate; 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation; 
(6) every credit agreement. 
(a) As used in Subsection (6): 
(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by 
a financial institution to lend, delay, or otherwise 
modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or 
things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to 
make any other financial accommodation. 
"Credit agreement" does not include the usual 
and customary agreements related to deposit 
accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated 
with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution 
which extends credit or extends a financial ac-
commodation under a credit agreement with a 
debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or 
obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial 
E. Utah Code Annotated 78-40-2 
78-40-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-40-2. Lis pendens. 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property 
the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defen-
dant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such 
answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the 
county m which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of the 
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the 
action or defense, and a description of the property m that county affected 
thereby From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser 
or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-40-2. 
ANALYSIS 
Divorce action 
Effect pending appeal 
Federal lawsuit 
Proof of lack of notice 
Purpose 
Slander of title 
Divorce action. 
A wife was entitled to file a notice of lis pen-
dens with respect to property whose title would 
be affected by a pending divorce action, but the 
notice would not be effective where third-party 
rights had arisen subsequent to the execution 
of quitclaim deeds by the wife m compliance 
with a prior divorce decree if the third party 
has no actual notice Boyce v Boyce, 609 P 2d 
928 (Utah 1980) 
Effect pending appeal. 
The recording of lis pendens is effective after 
judgment and pending appeal to give construc-
tive notice of the pendency of proceedings 
which may affect the title or right of possession 
of the owner of the real property involved Hid-
den Meadows Dev Co v Mills, 590 P 2d 1244 
(Utah 1979) 
Failure to furnish a supersedeas bond pend-
ing appeal has no effect on the notice given by 
a recorded lis pendens during the time after 
judgment and pending appeal Hidden 
Meadows Dev Co v Mills, 590 P2d 1244 
(Utah 1979) 
Federal lawsuit. 
The propnety of filing a notice of lis pendens 
from a federal lawsuit is a matter governed by 
state law Hamilton v Smith, 808 F 2d 36 
(10th Cir 1986) 
Proof of lack of notice. 
The fact that a deed was dated two weeks 
before the recording of the notice of lis pendens 
did not constitute conclusive proof that the 
grantee took without notice of claims to prop-
erty, since the deed was recorded a week after 
the lis pendens notice Harvey v Sanders, 534 
P 2d 905 (Utah 1975) 
Purpose. 
The sole purpose of recording a lis pendens is 
to give constructive notice of the pendency of 
proceedings which might be derogatory to the 
owner's title or right of possession, its only 
foundation is the action filed, and it has no 
existence independent of that Hansen v 
Kohler, 550 P 2d 186 (Utah 1976) 
Slander of title. 
The recording of a lis pendens, which serves 
as constructive notice of the pendency of an 
action, is in effect a republication of the plead-
ings in the underlying action, as such it is an 
absolutely privileged publication, and cannot 
become the basis of an action for slander of 
title Hansen v Kohler, 550 P 2d 186 (Utah 
1976) 
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F. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) 
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William D. BLODGETT and Florence G. 
Blodgett, his wife, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Joe MARTSCH, Betty Purcell, aka Betty 
Purcell Martsch, Doyle Nease, Raco Car 
Wash Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Wayne A. Ashworth, Trustee, Karl W. 
Tenny, Valley Bank & Trust Company, a 
Utah banking corporation, First Securi-
ty Bank of Idaho, N.A., State of Utah 
and John Does 1 through 10, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 15608. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 26, 1978. 
Former owners of land brought action 
against trustees under deed of trust and 
others to recover for alleged fraud arising 
out of the public sale of the property. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Er-
nest F. Baldwin, J., granted summary judg-
ment for defendants and plaintiffs appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held 
that: (1) evidence was sufficient to permit 
a finding that the trustee was in a confi-
dential relationship with the trustor and 
had breached that relationship; (2) succes-
sor trustee was not shown to have met 
statutory requirements with respect to pub-
lication and posting notice of the sales, and 
(3) purchaser of the land was not shown to 
be a bona fide purchaser. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Ellett, C. J., concurred in the result. 
Crockett, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Hall, J., filed an opinion concurring 
with reservations in which Wilkins, J., con-
curred. 
1. Appeal and Error e=>863, 1024.4 
In reviewing the record on the appeal 
from summary judgment, court treats the 
statements and evidentiary materials of the 
appellant as if a jury would receive them as 
the only credible evidence and the court 
sustains the judgment only if no issue of 
fact which could affect the outcome can be 
discerned. (Per Maughan, J., with one Jus-
tice concurring in the result, one Justice 
concurring specially, and two Justices con-
curring with reservation.) 
2. Fraud <s=»49 
In the absence of a confidential rela-
tionship, plaintiff seeking to recover on the 
theory of fraud must prove that defendant 
knowingly misrepresented a material fact 
with the intent to induce the plaintiffs to 
act or refrain from action and that the 
plaintiff, reasonably relying on the misrep-
resentation, acted or failed to act to his 
detriment. (Per Maughan, J., with one Jus-
tice concurring in the result, one Justice 
concurring specially, and two Justices con-
curring with reservation.) 
3. Fraud e=>7 
If the circumstances are such that the 
defendant could exercise extraordinary in-
fluence over the plaintiff and defendant 
was or should have been aware that plain-
tiff reposed trust and confidence in the 
defendant and reasonably relied on the de-
fendant's guidance, the parties are in a 
"confidential relationship" and the plain-
tiff's burden in Ifcase of fraud is considera-
bly diminished. (Per Maughan, J., with one 
Ju^ticeTconcurring in the result, one Justice 
concurring specially, and two Justices con-
curring with reservation.) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Fraud s=>50, 64(1) 
Whether litigants are in a confidential 
relationship at the time of the transactions 
about which they litigate is ordinarily a 
question of fact and is not to be found on 
the basis of mere friendship or social or 
religious affiliation between the parties; 
there are a few relationships, such as par-
ent-child, attorney-client, and trustee-cestui 
which the law presumes to be confidential. 
(Per Maughan, J., with one Justice concur-
ring in the result, one Justice concurring 
specially, and two Justices concurring with 
reservation.) 
5. Mortgages <s=>209 
The duty of the trustee under a trust 
deed is greater than the mere obligation to 
sell the pledged property in accordance with 
the default provision of the trust deed in-
strument; it is a duty to treat the trustor 
fairly and in accordance with a high punc-
tilio of honor. (Per Maughan, J., with one 
Justice concurring in the result, one Justice 
concurring specially, and two Justices con-
curring with reservation.) 
6. Fraud e=>4 
Breach of duty by the dominant party 
in a confidential relationship may be re-
garded as "constructive fraud;" it is unnec-
essary for the plaintiff to show an intent to 
defraud as constructive fraud is an equita-
ble doctrine employed by the courts to recti-
fy injury resulting from breach of obliga-
tions implicit in the relationship. (Per 
Maughan, J., with one Justice concurring in 
the result, one Justice concurring specially, 
and two Justices concurring with reserva-
tion.) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Fraud <s=>58(l) 
Evidence was sufficient to permit a 
finding that bank which was acting in trust 
under deed of trust was in a confidential 
relationship with trustors, who claimed that 
they were defrauded by the bank in the 
manner in which it handled the foreclosure. 
(Per Maughan, J., with one Justice concur-
ring in the result, one Justice concurring 
specially, and two Justices concurring with 
reservation.) 
8. Mortgages <s=>209 
Bank's silence as to the trust deed's 
contents at the time of closing, at the time 
of prepayment of the first loan, and at the 
time of public sale did not constitute a 
discharge of the bank's duties to the origi-
nal landowner as a matter of law; reasona-
ble diligence on the part of a trustee, where 
the trustor proclaims his confusion about 
the meaning of the instruments he is asked 
to sign, may require a full disclosure and 
explanation, particularly where the instru-
ments impose a heavier burden than the 
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trustor-signed documents in the trustee's 
hands authorize. (Per Maughan, J., with 
one Justice concurring in the result, one 
Justice concurring specially, and two Jus-
tices concurring with reservation.) 
9. Mortgages <s=>209 
Trustee's duty to trustors after he be-
came trustee under the deed was to act 
with reasonable diligence and good faith on 
behalf of the trustors consistent with his 
primary obligation to assure the payment of 
the secured debt. (Per Maughan, J., with 
one Justice concurring in the result, one 
Justice concurring specially, and two Jus-
tices concurring with reservation.) 
10. Mortgages «=>360 
Evidence that trustee under deed of 
trust failed to post sale notices where re-
quired, that he misdescribed the tracts and 
the notices that he did post, and that he did 
not inquire as to the trustors' preference 
about joint or sequential sale demonstrated 
that the trustee had not performed his stat-
utory duties. (Per Maughan, J., with one 
Justice concurring in the result, one Justice 
concurring specially, and two Justices con-
curring with reservation.) U.C.A.1953, 57-
1-25, 57-1-27. 
11. Mortgages <s=*372(3) 
Bona fide purchaser at a public sale 
under a trust deed may rely on the recitals 
in the deed he receives from the trustee 
after the sale and the sale can not be set 
aside because of irregularities in the publi-
cation or posting of notice. (Per Maughan, 
J., with one Justice concurring in the result, 
one Justice concurring specially, and two 
Justices concurring with reservation.) U.C. 
A.1953, 57-1-25, 57-1-27. 
12. Mortgages <s=>372(l) 
Purchaser of land at public sale who 
had been an insider in the corporation 
whose default on loan had given rise to the 
public sale under a deed of trust and who 
was married to the president of that corpo-
ration was not a bona fide purchaser enti-
tled to rely on the recitals of the deed 
issued by the trustee. (Per Maughan, J., 
with one Justice concurring in the result, 
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one Justice concurring specially, and two 
Justices concurring with reservation.) 
13. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>220 
"Bona fide purchaser" is one who takes 
without actual or constructive knowledge of 
facts sufficient to put him on notice of the 
complainant's equity. (Per Maughan, J., 
with one Justice concurring in the result, 
one Justice concurring specially, and two 
Justices concurring with reservation.) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Joseph Rust of Kirton, McConkie, Boyer 
& Boyle, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
Harry D. Pugsley, Donald Sawaya, Irving 
H. Biele, Lorin N. Pace, John P. Ashton, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respon-
dents. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
The Blodgetts here appeal from summary 
judgment of no cause of action on their 
complaint alleging fraud in transactions 
which culminated in the public sale of the 
Blodgetts' property at a price allegedly 
about one-eighth its appraisal or actual val-
ue. The public sale was effected pursuant 
to a trust deed. The Blodgetts allege they 
were unaware the major part of the proper-
ty so sold was included in the trust deed 
description, and their ignorance is attribut-
able to the trustee's misrepresentation and 
breach of duty to inform them about the 
contents of the deed. 
[1] In reviewing the record on any ap-
peal from summary judgment, we treat the 
statements and evidentiary materials of the 
appellant as if a jury would receive them as 
the only credible evidence, and we sustain 
the judgment only if no issues of fact which 
could affect the outcome can be discerned. 
Viewed in that light, the record supports 
the following statement of facts. 
In 1969, the Blodgetts were the owners of 
two tracts of land located at approximately 
6100 South on Highland Drive in Salt Lake 
County. On the larger tract (the "store 
tract") they operated a grocery store. The 
smaller tract "car-wash tract") was adja-
cent to the store tract and was not utilized 
by the Blodgetts until they leased it to Raco 
Car Wash Systems, Inc. ("Raco") for the 
installation of a car wash facility in early 
1969. The lease instrument provided that 
the Blodgetts would permit the car-wash 
tract to be pledged as security for a loan 
Raco required to finance the car wash in-
stallation. 
Raco, acting through its president, Betty 
Purcell, made arrangements for the loan 
with Respondent Valley Bank & Trust 
Company (the "Bank") with which the 
Blodgetts had a significant previous busi-
ness history as borrowers and depositors. 
On November 5,1971, at about 5:30 p. m. 
the Blodgetts attended the Raco loan clos-
ing at the Bank's office. They intended to 
execute documents necessary for the hy-
pothecation of the car-wash tract alone, al-
though they recognized an access easement 
over the store tract was involved. The only 
commitment the Blodgetts had made until 
the moment of closing was the one con-
tained in the Raco lease instrument, of 
which the Bank had a copy. Without the 
Blodgetts' knowledge, the Bank had advised 
Raco it required stronger security than the 
car-wash tract alone, had been advised by 
Raco the Blodgetts would pledge the store 
tract as well, and had prepared for the 
Blodgetts' execution a trust deed which 
conveyed both the car-wash tract and the 
store tract. In addition, without first dis-
cussing the matter with either Raco or the 
Blodgetts, the Bank had prepared a note for 
signature by the Blodgetts as co-makers, 
even though the Blodgetts' signature on the 
note was not necessary to satisfy any inter-
nal requirement of the Bank or any exter-
nal requirement of regulatory authority. 
Although the Bank usually explained 
loan documents to borrowers unless they 
demonstrated some degree of sophistication, 
the Bank in this case offered the Blodgetts 
no explanation of the trust deed contents 
and, in particular, failed to call attention to 
the trust deed's departure from the concept 
of the Raco-Blodgett lease. Bank personnel 
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spent some half hour explaining the loan 
documents to Ms. Purcell (although neither 
she nor her corporation was making any 
contribution to the real property collateral), 
but made no similar effort to inform the 
Blodgetts. This was so even though the 
Blodgetts announced they did not under-
stand the loan documents. When the Blod-
getts asked about the note, the Bank-falsery 
advised thejm they assumed only a second-
ary or "stand-by" obligation by signing it. 
The Blodgetts requested copies of all the 
loan documents, but the Bank sent them a 
copy of the note only. 
Raco defaulted on the secured note. Af-
ter the loan was consummated, but before 
the trustee undertook sale of the Blodgett 
tracts, the Blodgetts satisfied (by $20,000.00 
prepayment) a loan which was secured by 
the store tract and which predated the Raco 
loan. The Bank did not then call the Blod-
getts attention to a remaining encumbrance 
on the store tract or suggest the tract was 
in jeopardy. 
By the time proceedings were instituted 
for public sale of the Blodgett tracts, Re-
spondent Wayne Ashworth had been substi-
tuted for the Bank as trustee. The substi-
tution was effected in compliance with stat-
ute and with actual notice to the Blodgetts. 
There is no showing that Ashworth knew of 
the non-disclosures of the Bank, or of its 
unauthorized inclusion of the store tract, in 
the trust deed. 
In effecting the public sale of the Blod-
gett tracts, Ashworth failed to comply with 
the statute (Section 57-1-25) which pre-
scribes the procedure for public notice. 
Both the published and posted notices failed 
to identify the property in that two calls 
were omitted from the description, and only 
two of the notices were posted in the pre-
cinct where the tracts lie. 
The Blodgetts were present at the public 
sale and so were Ashworth and the Bank. 
In the course of the sale proceedings, the 
Blodgetts, by reason of their misconception 
that only the car-wash tract was subject to 
sale, failed to take the most elementary 
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kinds of self-interest action. For example, 
although our statute (57-1-27) requires the 
trustee, where two or more tracts are being 
sold under a trust deed, to follow the trus-
tors direction with regard to joint sale or 
sequential sales of the tracts, the Blodgetts 
did not request the sale of the car-wash 
tract (which alone had a value in excess of 
the secured debt) as a first and separate 
transaction. Moreover, the Blodgetts did 
not enter the bidding for the combined 
tracts even though the high bid was a bare-
ly significant fraction of their value. Nei-
ther Ashworth nor the Bank consulted with, 
advised, or sought instruction from the 
Blodgetts before or during the public sale. 
Both acted purely in the Bank's interest 
and took the course of action most likely to 
assure that the Bank would either be paid in 
full or acquire the tracts at a bargain price. 
The high bidder at the public sale was Re-
spondent Joe Martsch. Martsch had been a 
director of Raco (now defunct) during its 
operative years, and was married to Betty 
Purcell at the time of the sale. 
The deed by which Ashworth conveyed 
the Blodgett tracts to Martsch falsely 
recited that all statutory requirements for 
public sale had been satisfied. Martsch in 
fact paid $30,000 for the deed. The Blod-
getts first became aware that the store 
tract had been included in the sale when 
Martsch asserted his rights of ownership 
after the sale. 
[2] The Blodgetts first seek relief 
against the Bank and Ashworth on the ba-
sis of fraud and abuse of confidential rela-
tionship. The elements of a fraud action 
have frequently been stated by this Court.1 
The plaintiff must, in the absence of confi-
dential relationship, prove the defendant 
knowingly misrepresented a material fact 
with intent to induce the plaintiff to act or 
refrain from action and that the plaintiff, 
reasonably relying on the misrepresenta-
tion, acted (or failed to act) to his detri-
ment. 
Stuck v. Delta L & W Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791; Guaranty Mtg. Co. v. Flint, 66 Utah 128, 
240 P. 175. 
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[3] If the circumstances are such that 
the defendant could exercise extraordinary 
influence over the plaintiff and the defend-
ant was or should have been aware the 
plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the 
defendant and reasonably relied on defend-
ant's guidance, then the parties are said to 
be in "confidential relationship" and the 
plaintiff's burden is considerably diminish-
e d ^ A course ofjdealing between persons 
m situateSTTs watched with extreme jeal-
/ousy and solicitude, and if there is found 
the slightest trace of undue influence or 
unfair advantage, redress will be given to 
the injured party." 2 
[4] Whether litigants were in confiden-
tial relationship at the time of the transac-
tions about which they litigate is ordinarily 
a question of fact and is not to be found on 
the basis of mere friendship or social or 
religious affiliation between the parties.3 
There are a few relationships (such as par-
ent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui) 
which the law presumes to be confidential. 
The relationship which arises when a bor-
rower secures his loan by trust deed has 
been the subject of considerable judicial 
comment. Among cases which have de-
clared the trustee under a deed of trust to 
be in fiduciary relationship with the trustor 
are Furst v. Loftin, 29 N.CApp. 248, 224 
S.E.2d 641 (1976), Spires v. Edgar, 513 
S.W.2d 372 (Mo.1974), Woodworth v. iied-
wood Empire Savings & Loan Assn., 22 
Cal.App.3d 347, 99 CaLRptr. 373 (1971), and 
Feldman v. Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 109 S.E.2d 
379. 
[5] The duty of the trustee under a 
trust deed is greater than the mere obliga-
tion to sell the pledged property in accord-
ance with the default provision of the trust 
deed instrument, it is a duty to^treat the 
trustor fairly and in^accordance with a high 
punctilio of honor. In discussing the differ-
ence between the duties of a mortgagee and 
the trustee under a trust deed, the Court of 
2. 37 Am.Jur.2d 38, Fraud and Deceit, § 15. 
3. Thatcher v. Peterson, 20 Utah 2d 290, 437 
P.2d 213. 
Appeals of District of Columbia in Spruill v. 
Ballard, 61 App.D.C. 112, 58 F.2d 517, made 
this statement: 
The practice of securing money by deed 
of trust on real estate is the nearly uni-
versal method in effect in the District of 
Columbia. The ease and facility of fore-
closure under it commends it over the 
more cumbersome form of mortgage 
which must be foreclosed in court, but 
this very fact imposes upon courts the 
duty of scrutinizing all sales had under it 
which are questioned, and of setting 
those aside in which fraud or over-
reaching has been practiced by the trus-
tee. In Church Inv. v. Holmes, 60 App. 
D.C. 27, 46 F.2d 608, we said a trustee 
named in a deed of trust to secure a loan 
sustains a fiduciary relation to the debtor 
as well as the creditor, . 
[6] The breach of duty by the dominant 
party in a confidential relationship may be 
regarded as constructive fraud. It js_un^ 
necessjuxfor.the plaintifF?o showman jntent 
to^defraud; constructive fraud is an equita-1 
ble doctrine employed by the courts to recti- I 
fy injury resulting from breach of the obli- \ 
gations implicit in the relationship.4 —y 
[7] In this case, there is more upon 
which to predicate confidential relationship 
between the Blodgetts and the Bank than 
the mere utilization of trust deed in the 
loan transaction. The Blodgetts had been 
long time customers of the Bank and had 
previously borrowed on the security of the 
store tract. They were not strangers at the 
Raco loan closing. Finally, there is room 
for inference that trust companies, if they 
use the trust deed mechanism with no in-
tent to be protective of borrowers, exploit 
the euphoria engendered by the word 
"trust." The statute permits only entities 
with credentials of trustworthiness to act as 
"trustees,"5 and the instrument of transfer 
is denominated a "trust" deed. It may not 
be generally understood by those who con-
4. Carnes v. Meador, 553 S.W. 365 (Tex. 1975); 
Vogt v. Town & Country Realty of Lincoln, 194 
Neb. 308, 231 N.W.2d 496 (1975). 
5. 57-1-21, U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
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vey by trust deed that the only entity to 
which thejrustee feels fiduciary obligation 
is itself. 
The Bank, in seeking summary judgment, 
asserted that none_of its personnel made 
any representation, false or otherwise, 
about the content of the trust deed the 
Blodgetts signed. Any claimed false repre-
sentation related to the nature of the obli-
gation the Blodgetts assumed, by signing 
the note, and is not material, because the 
public sale of Blodgetts' property would 
have taken place in the same way if the 
Blodgetts had never signed the note in any 
capacity. 
[8] We cannot agree the Bank's silence 
about the trust deed's contents at the Raco 
loan closing, at the time of the prepayment 
of the first Blodgett loan, and at the time 
of the public sale constituted a discharge of 
the Bank's duties as a matter of law if the 
facts are indeed as the record would permit 
a jury to find. Reasonable diligence on the 
part of a trustee, where the trustor pro-
claims his confusion about the meaning of 
the instruments he is asked to sign, may 
require a full disclosure and explanation, 
particularly where the instruments impose 
a heavier burden than trustor-signed docu-
ments in the trustee's hands authorize. We 
have already noted the other occasions 
when the Bank may have had a duty to 
speak. 
[9,10] As to Respondent Ashworth, his 
duty to the Blodgetts after he became trus-
tee was to act with reasonable diligence and 
good_faith on their behalf consistent with 
his primary obligation to assure the pay-
ment of the secured debt. He had certain 
clear statutory duties with regard to (1) 
advertisement of the sale (Sec. 57-1-25) 
and (2) deference to the Blodgetts' prefer-
ence as to the joint or sequential sale of the 
tracts (Sec. 57-1-27). It can hardly be said 
that Ashworth satisfied those obligations as 
a matter of law. The only evidence in the 
record is that he failed to post sale notices 
where required, that the posted notices mis-
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described the tracts, and that he did not 
inquire as to the Blodgetts' preference 
about joint or sequjentialsale, let alone de-
fer to that preference. 
[11] Our statutes protect a bona fide 
purchaser at a public sale under a trust 
deed, by permitting him to rely on the 
recitals in the deed he receives from the 
trustee after the sale. Such a sale cannot 
be set aside because of irregularities in the 
publication or posting of notice. 
Ashworth may satisfy a jury that he act-
ed appropriately. On the record before us 
however, there is an issue of fact whether 
Ashworth exercised reasonable diligence to 
protect the trustor's interests in the proce-
dures incident to the public sale. 
[12,13] As to defendant Martsch, the 
evidence before us does not lead to the 
conclusion he qualified as a bona fide pur-
chlSerTso as txTbe entitled to rely on the 
recitals of the deed issued by the trustee; 
after the public sale. A bona fide purchas-
er is one who takes without actual or con-
structive knowledge of facts sufficient to 
put him on notice of the complainant's equi-
ty.6 
The end result of the legal maneuvers in 
this case is that a Raco insider, for merely 
satisfying a debt which was primarily 
Raco's now claims, free of any Blodgett 
equity, the^proceeds from condemnation of 
the car "wash tract by the State of Utah 
(and such proceeds exceed the price paid at 
the sale), and further claims the store tract 
which has significantly greater value. We 
cannot agree that Martsch, by virtue of his 
association with Raco and Purcell, could not 
be found to have had at least constructive 
knowledge of the fact that the Blodgetts 
were unaware the store tract was being 
sold. 
While the transfer to the State of Utah 
as the result of condemnation cannot now 
be set aside, the equitable remedies associ-
6. Orso v Cater, 272 Ala 657, 133 So 2d 864, Sieger v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 649, 
318 P.2d 479. 
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ated with unjust enrichment7 are not fore-
closed to the Blodgetts as against Martsch 
on the facts revealed by the record, nor is 
restoration of the Blodgetts* title to the 
store tract beyond the court's powers if title 
is found not to be in a bona fide purchaser. 
Summary judgment being inappropriate 
on the state of the record, the matter is 
remanded for trial as against Martsch, Ash-
worth, and the Bank. With regard to the 
Blodgetts' action against the State of Utah, 
however, summary judgment is affirmed. 
Discovery has revealed no basis for confi-
dential relationship between the Blodgetts 
and the State or for questioning the State's 
bona fides or for a finding that the State 
has been unjustly enriched. 
ELLETT, C. J., concurs in result. 
CROCKETT, J., concurs by separate opin-
ion. 
HALL, J., concurs with reservation by 
separate opinion. 
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring): 
I concur with the main opinion and also 
with the comments of Justice Hall: that we 
should not presume to evaluate nor draw 
conclusions from the evidence, but that 
should be done at the trial. 
HALL, Justice (concurring with reserva-
tion): 
Summary judgment is a ruling of the 
court as a matter of law and is only appro-
priate when no genuine issue of material 
fact exists. 
I agree that summary judgment was not 
proper in this case because of the existence 
of the various issues of fact noted in the 
main opinion that may only be determined 
by a fact-finder. Consequently, I concur in 
reversing and remanding for trial on the 
issues that exist with respect to the claim of 
Martsch, Ashworth and the Bank. 
It being the prerogative of the fact-find-
er to hear the evidence, make findings of 
fact, and draw inferences and conclusions of 
law therefrom to support its judgment, I do 
not adopt the "statement of facts" set forth 
in the main opinion except to the extent 
necessary to support the Court's conclusion 
that issues of fact are present requiring a 
trial. 
WILKINS, Justice, concurs in the views 
expressed in the concurring opinion of 
HALL, J. 
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Craig MECHAM and John Hedman, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Myron L. BENSON and Ellen Benson, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 15649. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 2, 1979. 
Sellers brought action against buyers 
on a mobile home sales contract for unpaid 
balance of purchase price. Buyers counter-
claimed charging fraud in inducement. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
James S. Sawaya, J., entered judgment, 
which was pursuant to a jury verdict of no 
cause of action on sellers' complaint and 
which awarded buyers return of their down 
payment, plus attorney fees, and sellers ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., 
held that: (1) on basis of unchallenged in-
structions, jury could find that buyers were 
fraudulently induced, made timely rescis-
sion, and, by permitting repossession, ten-
dered back what they had received under 
contract; (2) under circumstances, sellers, 
7. 66 Am.Jur.2d 945, Restitution and Implied Contracts, Sec. 3, Restatement of Restitution, 
Sec. 1 et seq. 
G. Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432 (D. Utah 1992) 
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the decision on rehearing. Thus, so long as 
the garnishment lien attaches to funds be-
longing to the debtor before the mortgagee 
takes the action required to enforce its rent 
assignment, the mortgagee loses those 
funds to the judgment creditor. While the 
mortgagee was able to gain priority to 
rents coming due in the future, it was not 
able to gain priority to accrued rents at-
tached by the garnishment before the mort-
gagee took enforcement steps. Conse-
quently, contrary to Balcor's assertion, 
Farmers Union shows that Kansas law 
does, not permit perfection of a rent assign-
ment to be completely effective against an 
entity that acquires rights in the rents be-
fore the date of enforcement, i.e., the mort-
gagee has no right to vitiate retroactively 
the lien of the garnishing judgment credi-
tor. Although it is true that § 546(b) 
"merely requires that state law 'permit[] 
perfection of an interest in property to be 
effective against an entity that acquires 
rights in such property before the date of 
such perfection/ " (Balcor brief at 10, em-
phasis in original), state law in this in-
stance does not permit a mortgagee's inter-
est in rents to defeat the garnishor's right 
to accrued rents attached by the garnish-
ment This Court believes § 546(b) applies 
only when state law allows the perfection 
of a creditor's lien to relate back against all 
claims to all property subject to the lien, 
not just against claims to property to be 
acquired by the debtor in the future. The 
trustee, exercising under § 544(a)(2) the 
same rights as the garnishing judgment 
creditor in Farmers Union, thus has rights 
to the rents as of the date of filing against 
which the mortgagee's rights are ineffec-
tive. Since Kansas law does not permit 
Balcor's lien to defeat (be effective against) 
nishing judgment creditor as of the filing 
date, § 546(b) is not available to Balcor. 
[5, 6] As the Court pointed out in Gless-
ner, all that this ruling will do to Balcor is 
delay recovery of its money. If the debtor 
fails in its reorganization efforts, Balcor 
will be able to foreclose on the property 
and collect the rents while that foreclosure 
is pending, if it can satisfy the require-
ments of state law to do so. As held in 
United Savings v. Timbers oflnwood For* 
est, 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 
740 (1988), an undersecured creditor like 
Balcor is not entitled to be protected 
against the losses that are caused by the 
forced delay in realizing on its collateral 
while the bankruptcy is pending, just 
against any diminution in the value of the 
property during that time. 
For these reasons, just as in Glessner, 
the Court concludes Balcor's interest in the 
debtor's rents was not perfected under 
Kansas law as of the date the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy as required to withstand 
the trustee's avoiding power under 
§ 544(a)(2), and consequently, the post-peti-
tion rents are not Balcor's cash collateral 
The foregoing constitutes Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law under Rule 
7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure and Rule 52(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
James H. BUSCH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
James DOYLE, Defendant. 
Civ. No. 90-C-704B. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, CD. 
April 10, 1992. 
action claiming that employer failed to pay 
monthly compensation and percentage of 
gross profits received from sale or ex-
change of land. The District Court, Ben-
son, J., held that: (1) Rule 11 sanctions for 
filing counterclaim which was addressed in 
stipulation to bankruptcy settlement agree-
ment were not warranted; (2) triable issues 
of fact existed as to whether employer's 
payment of money on promissory note to 
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court rather than to employee was suffi-
cient to make funds available to employee; 
^d (3) employer was not entitled to ex-
clude documents exchanged between em-
ployer and attorney on grounds of attor-
ney-client privilege. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Bankruptcy <s=>2187 
Employer's stipulation in bankruptcy 
proceedings brought by employee that he 
would not seek or make any claim against 
employee in connection with filing of invol-
untary petition did not mean that Rule 11 
sanctions were appropriate where employer 
filed counterclaim in separate action, as 
scope of bankruptcy settlement agreement 
and extent to which it prohibited subse-
quent claims was unsettled matter; it was 
not shown that counterclaim was filed in 
bad faith or in violation of Rule 11. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 11, 41(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <£=*2486 
There were genuine issues of material 
fact, precluding summary judgment for 
employer, as to whether payments employ-
er had made to employee were to be ap-
plied toward promissory notes or were in-
tended to pay off other obligations. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>2488 
There was a genuine issue of material 
fact, precluding summary judgment for 
employee, as to whether it was necessary 
for employee to place promissory notes in 
hands of attorney for collection, reason-
ableness of attorney fees, possible failure 
of employee to mitigate damages and 
whether delay in payment on note was 
solely due to employer's depositing money 
with registry of clerk of court. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure e=>1537, 1921 
Employee's failure to provide complete 
answers to interrogatories and failure to 
provide list of trial exhibits was not suffi-
cient to warrant discovery sanctions. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(b), 28 U.S.C.A.; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2. 
5. Lis Pendens <s=>15 
Where employee did not allege exist-
ence of equitable lien in his complaint but 
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sought monetary damages only, employee 
could not file lis pendens; lis pendens could 
not be filed in cases seeking only money 
judgment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(b), 
28 U.S.C.A.; U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2. 
6. Witnesses <s=>204(2) 
Employer whose employee had access 
to documents exchanged between employer 
and attorney was not entitled to exclude 
those documents on grounds of attorney-
client privilege in breach of contract action. 
7. Witnesses <s=205 
Communications with attorney which 
employer had not intended to keep confi-
dential from employee were not privileged 
as to employee. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B); 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 72(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
8. Witnesses ®=>184(1) 
Existence of agency relationship does 
not override general requirement of intent 
of confidentiality; communication is not 
privileged as to party if there is no intent 
to keep communication confidential. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(2). 
David E. Leta, Stephen R. Cochell, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff and counter-
defendant. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Gerald H. Kinghorn, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for counter-claimant. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, John D. O'ConneU, 
Gregory L. Probst, Harriet E. Styler, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
BENSON, District Judge. 
On April 3, 1992, the court heard oral 
argument on several pending matters: (1) 
plaintiff James H. Busch's Motion to Dis-
miss Counts 4, 7, and 8 Without Prejudice; 
(2) defendant James Doyle's Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal of Counterclaim; (3) 
plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment; (4) defendant's Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment; (5) plaintiff's 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; (6) 
plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment; 
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(7) defendant's Motion for an Order to Re-
lease Lis Pendens; and (8) defendant's Ob-
jections to Magistrate Order Denying Mo-
tion in Limine. Stephen R. Cochell repre-
sented the plaintiff, James H. Busch. 
Gregory L. Probst, Gerald H. Kinghorn, 
and John D. O'Connell represented the de-
fendant, James Doyle. 
Having reviewed the memoranda sub-
mitted by the parties, having heard oral 
argument from counsel, being fully ap-
prised, and for good cause appearing, the 
court makes the following findings and en-
ters the following MEMORANDUM DECI-
SION and ORDER: 
Background 
This case involves a dispute over an oral 
contract for employment. James Doyle 
("defendant") was involved in a joint ven-
ture with RWR Investments, Inc., for the 
purpose of developing land adjacent to a 
golf course in southern Utah. He contact-
ed James Busch ("plaintiff), the market-
ing director of a golf club in Florida, and 
sought his help in the development of the 
land. The parties allegedly entered into an 
oral employment contract. In February, 
1989, plaintiff moved to Utah and began 
his employment. 
Over the next several months, defendant 
made several cash payments to plaintiff. 
In May, 1989, defendant borrowed $30,000 
from plaintiff. He later executed a promis-
sory note in that amount. In 1990, a dis-
agreement arose as to the amount of mon-
ey owed to plaintiff as compensation for his 
services. 
In July, 1990, plaintiff joined with other 
creditors in filing an involuntary petition of 
bankruptcy against defendant. In re 
James Doyle, Bankruptcy No. 90-04082. 
Defendant opposed the petition, arguing 
that it had been filed in bad faith. The 
petition was dismissed pursuant to a Stipu-
lation for Dismissal, dated July 27, 1990. 
Soon thereafter, plaintiff initiated the 
present litigation. Plaintiff alleges that de-
fendant breached a contract to pay monthly 
compensation as well as five percent of the 
gross profits received from the sale or ex-
change of the land. The Complaint seeks 
an accounting and the imposition of a con. 
structive trust. The Complaint also seeks 
recovery for breach of the promissory not* 
Defendant responded to the Complaint by 
filing a Counterclaim against plaintiff. .» 
Pursuant to this dispute, several motions 
are now pending before the court: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Counts 4, 
7, and 8 
Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss 
counts 4, 7, and 8 of the Complaint without 
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant 
has filed no opposition to this motion. Ac-
cordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion 
to Dismiss is GRANTED. Counts 4, 7, and 
8 of the Complaint are dismissed without 
prejudice. 
2, Defendant's Motion for Voluntary Dis-
missal of Counterclaim 
[1] Defendant seeks to voluntarily dis-
miss his Counterclaim, pursuant to Rule 
41(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Plaintiff opposes the motion, argu-
ing that defendant's motion to dismiss is an 
attempt to avoid sanctions under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff argues that the Counterclaim is 
prohibited by the settlement stipulation 
signed by the parties in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. Pursuant to the stipulation, 
defendant agreed that he would "not seek 
nor make any claim against [plaintiff] in 
connection with the filing of the Involun-
tary Petition." Plaintiff asserts that the 
allegations in the Counterclaim are identi-
cal to the claims prohibited by the bank-
ruptcy stipulation. Accordingly, plaintiff 
asks the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions 
against defendant. 
The court finds, however, that Rule 11 
sanctions are not appropriate in this case. 
The scope of the bankruptcy settlement 
agreement and the extent to which it pro-
hibits subsequent claims is an unsettled 
matter. Furthermore, many of the allega-
tions in the Counterclaim are unrelated to 
the settlement agreement. It has not been 
BUSCH 
Cite at 141 B.R. 
demonstrated that the Counterclaim was 
filed in bad faith or in violation of Rule 11. 
Thus, defendant's motion to voluntarily dis-
miss the counterclaim was not an attempt 
to avoid Rule 11 sanctions. Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 
41(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, defendant's Motion for Voluntary 
Dismissal of Counterclaim is GRANTED. 
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby dis-
missed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plain-
tiffs request for Rule 11 sanctions is DE-
NIED. 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
As stated above, defendant's Counter-
claim has been dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
on those claims is therefore moot. Accord-
ingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Counterclaim is dismissed. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment 
[2] Defendant seeks summary judg-
ment on plaintiffs first cause of action— 
breach of contract on the promissory note. 
Under the note, defendant was obligated to 
pay $30,000 plus interest to plaintiff. It is 
undisputed that plaintiff has received pay-
ments from the defendant well in excess of 
$30,000. Thus, defendant argues that he 
has not breached his obligations under the 
promissory note and is entitled to a grant 
of summary judgment on that claim. 
Plaintiff argues, however, that the pay-
ments made by defendant were intended to 
pay off other obligations. He asserts that 
the money he has received from the defen-
dant represents only partial repayment of 
the note. 
The court finds that there exists a genu-
ine issue as to material facts on this issue. 
The question whether the payments re-
ceived by plaintiff represent a total or par-
tial repayment of the promissory note is an 
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issue which must be resolved by the trier 
of fact at trial. Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
first cause of action is DENIED. 
5. Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
[3] When the promissory note came 
due, defendant failed to tender payment 
directly to plaintiff. Instead, he deposited 
the money with the registry of the Clerk of 
Court, pursuant to litigation between de-
fendant and RWR Investments, Inc. RWR 
Investments, Inc. v. James Doyle, Civil 
No. 89-C-816S. Plaintiff argues that it 
was improper to deposit the payment with 
the court because the promissory note was 
not related to the RWR litigation. It is 
argued that because defendant failed to 
tender payment directly, plaintiff was re-
quired to obtain counsel to collect on the 
note, which resulted in unnecessary ex-
pense and delay. 
The promissory note contains the follow-
ing clause: 
The obligor further agrees that if this 
note shall be placed in the hands of an 
attorney for collection, he will pay rea-
sonable attorney's fees as well as legal 
costs and disbursements. 
Plaintiff argues that under this provision 
he is entitled to recover the attorney's fees 
and expenses incurred in obtaining the 
money from the clerk of court. 
Defendant argues that depositing the 
funds with the court was sufficient to 
make the funds available to plaintiff. He 
asserts that plaintiff could have obtained 
payment from the court without incurring 
attorney's fees. Plaintiff himself, it is ar-
gued, is responsible for the delay in dis-
bursement of the funds. 
The court finds that there exists a genu-
ine issue as to material facts on this sub-
ject. Whether it was necessary for plain-
tiff to place the note in the hands of an 
attorney for collection, the reasonableness 
of the attorney's fee, and the possible fail-
ure of plaintiff to mitigate damages are all 
material issues of fact which must be decid-
ed at trial. Accordingly, 
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IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment is DE-
NIED. 
6. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judg-
ment 
[4] Plaintiff alleges that defendant 
should be sanctioned for failure to comply 
with court-ordered discovery. Specifically, 
it is alleged that defendant failed to pro-
vide complete answers to interrogatories 
and failed to provide a list of trial exhibits. 
Plaintiff moves the court to impose default 
judgment or some lesser sanction upon de-
fendant pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The court, however, finds that the con-
duct of defendant is not sufficient to war-
rant discovery sanctions. Because of the 
dismissal of defendant's counterclaim, 
much of the disputed discovery is no longer 
relevant. Furthermore, the court finds 
that plaintiff has suffered no prejudice. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion 
for Default Judgment is DENIED. 
7. Defendant's Motion for an Order to 
Release Lis Pendens 
[5] Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1992) 
allows for the filing of lis pendens "[i]n any 
action affecting the title to, or the right of 
possession of, real property." Pursuant to 
this statute, plaintiff filed a notice of lis 
pendens on a parcel of land owned by de-
fendant. 
Defendant has filed a motion to release 
the lis pendens, arguing that the present 
litigation affects neither the title to nor the 
right of possession of real property. He 
asserts that a suit for monetary damages 
does not allow for a filing of lis pendens. 
Plaintiff argues that the litigation is suf-
ficient to allow for a lis pendens filing 
under the statute. The Complaint alleges 
that plaintiff is entitled to five percent of 
the gross profits realized from the sale or 
exchange of the land. It seeks an account-
ing and the imposition of a constructive 
trust on those profits. Plaintiff maintains 
that because he claims a share of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the property, his suit 
affects the rights of possession and title 
Furthermore, he argues that defendants 
actions give rise to an equitable lien upoe 
the property. 
^The court, however, finds that the filing 
lof lis pendens was improper in this caa£ 
J Plaintiff did not allege the existence of a& 
equitable lien in his Complaint. The Cojfl. 
plaint seeks monetary damages only. Utaln 
law does not allow for the filing of Kg 
pendens in cases seeking a money judg, 
ment. See Hamilton v. Smith, 808 F.2d 36 
ilOth Cir.1986). A claim for a share of the 
proceeds from the sale of land, when and tf 
the land is sold, does not affect the title to 
nor right of possession of the land. Ac-
cordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Mo-
tion for an Order to Release Lis Pendens jg 
GRANTED. 
8. Defendant's Objections to Magistrate 
Judge's Order Denying Motion in li-
mine 
Defendant seeks to exclude from evi-
dence various communications made be-
tween defendant and his attorney. Pursu-
ant to defendant's litigation with a thirci 
party, defendant exchanged various doe» 
uments with his attorney. Plaintiff, as an 
agent of defendant working in defendant's 
offices, had access to these documents. He 
now seeks to use this information as evi-
dence in the present litigation. 
Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to 
exclude the evidence, arguing that the in-
formation is protected under the attorney-
client privilege. The motion was referred 
to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(B). The matter was fully 
briefed and argued before the magistrate 
judge. The magistrate judge held that a 
party invoking the attorney-client privilege 
must establish as a threshold requirement 
an intent to keep the information confiden-
tial. He found that defendant and his at-
torney did not intend to keep the informa-
tion confidential from plaintiff. According-
ly, the Motion in Limine was denied. 
[6] Defendant made a timely filing of 
Objections to the magistrate judge's Order, 
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pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules 
0f Civil Procedure. Under this rule, the 
district court shall consider objections and 
set aside any portion of the order which is 
found to be "clearly erroneous" or "con-
trary to law." 
Defendant first argues that the magis-
trate judge improperly applied the common 
interest rule of Evans v. Evans, 8 Utah 2d 
26, 327 P.2d 260 (1958). He asserts that 
Evans applies only to those cases where 
there has been previous joint representa-
tion by a single attorney. In the present 
case, no attorney-client relationship existed 
between plaintiff and defendant's attorney. 
Thus, it is argued, the magistrate judge 
incorrectly applied Evans to the facts of 
this case. 
[7] The court, however, disagrees with 
defendant's arguments. Defendant has 
misinterpreted the magistrate judge's rul-
ing. The magistrate judge did not hold 
that Evans is controlling in the present 
case. He merely stated that the reasoning 
of Evans is applicable. There, the court 
found that where communications were not 
intended to be confidential, the attorney-
client privilege could not be invoked to 
exclude those communications. Quoting 
from Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 
159 P.2d 142, 147 (1945), the Evans court 
stated: 
The mere fact that the relationship of 
attorney and client exists between two 
individuals does not ipso facto make all 
communications between them confiden-
tial. As noted in Wigmore on Evidence, 
"the circumstances are to indicate wheth-
er by implication the communication was 
of a sort intended to be confidential." 
Evans, 327 P.2d at 261. Thus, courts must 
look at the circumstances to determine 
whether there was an intent to keep the 
attorney-client communications confiden-
tial. No privilege exists without an intent 
of confidentiality. 
In Evans, the court found that where the 
parties were jointly represented by counsel, 
there was no intent to keep the communica-
tions confidential. Similarly, the magis-
trate found that under the circumstances 
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of the present case, there was no intent to 
keep the communications confidential from 
plaintiff. 
Defendant next argues that there is an 
exception to the requirement of intent 
when an agency relationship exists. He 
asserts that an employer may invoke the 
privilege against his agent, even if there 
was no intent to keep the communication 
confidential from the agent. The attorney-
client privilege, it is argued, universally 
prevents former employees from using at-
torney-client communications as evidence 
against their employer. 
Defendant cites to Blankenskip v. 
Rowntree, 219 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.1955) to 
support this proposition. There, a memo-
randum was given to an employee to be 
sent to the employer's attorney. The em-
ployee sought to use the memorandum as 
evidence in subsequent litigation between 
the employer and employee. The court re-
fused to allow the evidence, finding that it 
was a confidential communication subject 
to the attorney-client privilege. 
Although the facts of Blankenskip are 
somewhat similar to the present case, there 
is one significant difference between the 
two cases. In the present case, the magis-
trate made a finding that neither defendant 
nor his attorney intended the communica-
tions to be confidential as to the plaintiff. 
In Blankenskip, no such finding was 
made. In fact, the court found that the 
memorandum was privileged as a "confi-
dential" communication between the attor-
ney and the employer. Blankenskip, 219 
F.2d at 599. 
Defendant himself stated that in Blank-
enskip, "[t]he court found that the doc-
ument was intended to be a confidential 
attorney-client privileged document—" 
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support 
of Objections to Order on Motion in Limine 
by Magistrate Judge, at 6. This contrasts 
with the present case where the magistrate 
judge found just the opposite. According-
ly, Blankenskip does not support the prop-
osition that intent of confidentiality is not 
required when invoking the attorney-client 
privilege against a former employee. 
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Under Utah law, communications ob-
tained by certain agents of the attorney are 
privileged. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-
8(2) (1992). However, the court is aware of 
no statute extending this privilege to 
agents of the client. 
[8] The court finds that the existence of 
an agency relationship does not override 
the general requirement of intent of confi-
dentiality. There is no universal privilege 
against evidence obtained by former em-
ployees. Blankenship does not stand for 
that proposition. The other cases cited by 
defendant are not persuasive, and are not 
binding in this jurisdiction. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the magis-
trate judge's ruling was contrary to law. 
When there has been no intent to keep a 
communication confidential from a third 
party, the communication is not privileged 
as to that party. Denial of the Motion of 
Limine, therefore, was proper. According-
ly, 
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's objec-
tions to the magistrate judge's Order deny-
ing motion in limine are overruled. The 
Order of the magistrate judge is AF-
FIRMED and ADOPTED by the Court. 
In re Grady W. McDANIEL & Margaret 
McDaniel, Debtors. 
Bankruptcy No. 91-02148. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
N.D. Florida. 
April 7, 1992. 
Chapter 7 trustee objected to debtor's 
"Claim of Exempt Property." The Bank-
ruptcy Court, Lewis M. Killian, Jr., J., held 
that postpetition profit-sharing payments 
from debtor's former accounting firm, 
which were payable if debtor refrained 
from competing, were part of the bankrupt-
cy estate. 
Objection sustained. 
Bankruptcy <$=>2558 
Monthly payments to debtor from his 
former accounting firm under profit-shar-
ing agreement triggered when debtor sold 
his stock in the firm were not excluded 
from debtor's estate as payments for post-
petition services, even though debtor would 
forfeit right to payments if he competed 
with the firm; the covenant not to compete 
was penalty separate from the main objec-
tive of the transaction, which was to sell 
the debtor's stock in the firm, and earnings 
for services not performed are not exclud-
ed from the estate under the exclusion for 
earnings for postpetition services. Bankr. 
Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(6). 
Jerry W. Gerde, Panama City, Fla., for 
debtor. 
Ronald A. Mowrey, Tallahassee, Fla., 
Trustee. 
ORDER ON TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION 
TO CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
LEWIS M. KILLIAN, JR., Bankruptcy 
Judge. 
This matter came before the Court on 
Ronald A. Mowrey, Trustee's objection to 
Debtors' Grady W. and Margaret McDan-
iel, Claim of Exempt Property. The issue 
before the Court is whether payments from 
Debtor's former CPA firm are fresh start 
wages under § 541(a)(6) and therefore ex-
cluded from Debtor's estate. Having con-
sidered the argument of counsel, the evi-
dence presented, and for the reasons set 
out below, we hold that the payments are 
part of Debtor's estate and not within the 
"services" exception of § 541(a)(6). 
FACTS 
Debtor was a shareholder in an account-
ing firm organized as a professional associ-
ation. The firm's "employment agree-
ment" specified that if any of the members 
left the firm, the remaining members 
H. Jenner v. Real Estate Services 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983) 
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ing within a reasonable time, failing which 
the grantor has a power of termination. 
The majority cites in support thereof Salt 
Lake City v. State, 101 Utah 543, 125 P.2d 
790 (1942) and two cases cited and discussed 
therein, Trustees of Union College v. City 
of New York, 173 N.Y. 38, 65 N.E. 853 
(1903) and Norton v. Valentine, 151 App. 
Div. 392,195 N.Y.S. 1084 (1912). However, 
in each of those cases there was contained 
in the deed an express provision that if the 
land were used for any purpose other than 
that stated in the deed (Governor's resi-
dence, tabernacle and pastor's residence and 
City Hall), the land would revert to the 
grantor. In those cases the intent of the 
grantor is clear and manifest. I have no 
quarrel with the law which revests title in 
the grantor when the property is not so 
used within a reasonable time. However, 
in the instant case all we have is the naked 
statement that the property conveyed is to 
be used as and for a church or residence 
purposes only. This could be nothing more 
than an attempt on the part of the grantor 
to prevent the property from being used for 
commercial or industrial purposes which 
would interfere with her enjoyment in re-
siding on her remaining property. It does 
not appear to affirmatively require that a 
church or residence ever be built. 
No condition having been clearly ex-
pressed, and recognizing the fact that con-
ditions controlling the use of deeded proper-
ty are strictly construed against the grant-
or, and that forfeitures are not favored, I 
am led to conclude that the judgment below 
should be reversed. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HOWE, J. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
John R. JENNER and Maijorie E. 
Jenner, his wife, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
REAL ESTATE SERVICES, a Utah corpo-
ration; Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn 
M. Franich, his wife; and Larry J. Niel-
son and Kay Nielson, his wife, Defend-
ants and Respondents, 
Ronald Johnson, Intervenor 
and Appellant. 
No. 18100. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 2, 1983. 
Motions to intervene and to set aside 
default judgment were denied by the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal 
Taylor, J., and applicant for intervention 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that partner having chosen to remain 
undisclosed as partner and having permit-
ted his partner to assume a role of sole 
owner of their interest in property had no 
standing after default judgment to assert 
his interest, by way of intervention, as 
against innocent third parties, though he 
filed application for intervention within 11 
days after learning of entry of judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs. 
Affirmed. 
1. Parties <s=*42 
Rule permitting intervention as matter 
of right when applicant will be adversely 
affected by court's disposition of property 
requires that application be made timely, 
and timeliness is to be determined under 
facts and circumstances of each particular 
case, in sound discretion of the court. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24(a). 
2. Parties <s=>42 
Courts are reluctant to make excep-
tions to general rule that intervention is not 
to be permitted after entry of judgment, 
and exception is made only upon strong 
JENNER v. REAL 
Citeas,659P.2d 
showing of entitlement and justification, or 
such unusual or compelling circumstances 
as will justify failure to seek intervention 
earlier. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 24(a). 
3. Parties <s=>42 
Partner having chosen to remain undis-
closed as partner and having permitted his 
partner to assume a role of sole owner of 
their interest in property had no standing 
after default judgment to assert his inter-
est, by way of intervention, as against inno-
cent third parties, though he filed applica-
tion for intervention within 11 days after 
learning of entry of judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24(a). 
4. Partnership <s=»125 
Notice to partner of any matter relat-
ing to partnership affairs operates as notice 
to or knowledge of the partnership. U.C.A. 
1953, 48-1-9. 
G. Lee Rudd, Salt Lake City, for interve-
nor and appellant. 
Allen M. Swan, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs and respondents. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Ronald Johnson appeals from the denial 
of his motions to intervene and to set aside 
the default judgment entered against de-
fendants. 
Plaintiffs sold certain real property to 
defendant Real Estate Services on a con-
tract dated October, 1978. Thereafter, on 
March 30, 1979, Real Estate Services as-
signed its rights and obligations under the 
contract to defendants Franich and Nielson. 
Just prior thereto, on March 27, 1979, de-
fendant Joseph C. Franich entered into an 
agreement with Johnson whereby Johnson 
deposited $11,000 with Franich, who was to 
use the money for real estate investments. 
Franich was to receive a commission for 
managing the investments and he and 
Johnson would share equally the income 
and profits after the return of Johnson's 
capital investment. The subject property is 
that in which Franich invested Johnson's 
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money. Johnson's interest in the property 
was undisclosed to plaintiffs, and it was not 
made of record. 
Defendants failed to make the payments 
due under the contract. Plaintiffs elected 
to declare a forfeiture, and in August, 1981, 
sent each defendant a notice to pay the 
delinquent payments within five days or 
forfeit their interest in the property. 
Defendants did not respond to the notice 
and on August 19, 1981, plaintiffs initiated 
this lawsuit, seeking inter alia, forfeiture 
and cancellation of the contract and served 
a summons on each of the defendants. 
On September 15, 1981, Franich advised 
Johnson that he was leaving town and de-
sired to terminate their investment agree-
ment. He offered his interest in the sub-
ject property to Johnson for $10,000. John-
son paid Franich $5,000 and gave him a 
promissory note for the balance in return 
for a quit-claim deed to the property. 
On September 23, 1981, plaintiffs obtain-
ed a default judgment which forfeited the 
interest of all named defendants and can-
celled the contract. Johnson learned of the 
judgment on September 25, 1981, and im-
mediately contacted plaintiffs and offered 
to bring the contract current, but plaintiffs 
refused. Johnson filed his motions to inter-
vene and to set aside the judgment on 
October 6, 1981, and the district court de-
nied both motions. At the hearing, Johnson 
tendered the sum of $6,500 to bring the 
contract current, including attorney fees. 
It was declined. 
The issue presented by this appeal is 
whether the motion to intervene was time-
ly, having come after the entry of judg-
ment. 
[1] Rule 24(a), Utah R.Civ.P., permits 
intervention as a matter of right when the 
applicant will be adversely affected by the 
court's disposition of property. However, 
the right is not absolute. The Rule requires 
that the application for intervention be 
made timely.1 Use of the word "timely" in 
the Rule requires that the timeliness of the 
1. State v. Chavez, N M.f 45 N M 161, 113 P 2d 179 (1941). 
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application be determined under the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case, 
and in the sound discretion of the court. 
[2] Generally, the cases hold that inter-
vention is not to be permitted after entry of 
judgment.2 The courts are reluctant to 
make exceptions to the general rule3 and 
do so only upon a strong showing of entitle-
ment and justification,4 or such unusual or 
compelling circumstances5 as will justify 
the failure to seek intervention earlier. 
Postjudgment intervention is looked upon 
with disfavor by reason of the tendency 
thereof to prejudice the rights of existing 
parties and the undue interference it has 
upon the orderly processes of the court.6 
In Rains v. Lewis,1 the Washington court 
reaffirmed its holding in a prior case8 and 
stated the rule as follows: 
[I]f [intervention is] permitted after 
judgment, it should be only on a strong 
showing after taking into consideration 
all circumstances, including prior notice 
of the lawsuit and circumstances contrib-
uting to the delay in making the motion. 
To this we would add a showing of sub-
stantial prejudice if permission to inter-
vene is denied. 
[3,4] In the instant case, Johnson con-
tends that he had no notice that the con-
tract payments were in arrears, nor that 
suit had been initiated against Franich and 
the other defendants. He further contends 
that his motion for intervention was timely 
filed since he filed it within eleven days 
after learning of the entry of judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs. However, Johnson and 
Franich were partners or co-venturers. 
Such being the case, Johnson, having chosen 
to remain undisclosed as a partner and hav-
2. See 37 A.L.R.2d 1306. 
3. McClain v. Wagner Electric Corp., 550 F.2d 
1115 (CA.Mo. 1977). 
4. U.S. v. Association Milk Producers, Inc., 534 
F.2d 113 (CA.Mo. 1976). 
5. Com. of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 66 F.R.D. 598 
(D.C.Pa.1975), affd, 530 F.2d 501 (1977). 
6. U.S. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232 (C.A. 
Ala. 1977). 
ing permitted Franich to assume the role of 
sole owner of their interest in the property, 
has no standing now to assert his interest as 
against innocent third parties.9 Further-
more, notice to a partner of any matter 
relating to partnership affairs operates as 
notice to or knowledge of the partnership.10 
Applying the foregoing rules of law to 
the facts of this case, the trial court did not 
err in denying Johnson's motion to inter-
vene. Johnson was charged with notice of 
the default in the contract payments by 
virtue of the notice and demand for pay-
ment that was duly served upon Franich. 
He was also charged with notice that plain-
tiffs sought cancellation of the contract, 
restoration of possession and forfeiture by 
virtue of the summons which was also duly 
served upon Franich. 
In light of the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of this case, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying John-
son's motion for intervention on the 
grounds that it was untimely. Having so 
ruled, Johnson's further contention that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to 
set aside the default judgment is rendered 
moot. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiffs. 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE, and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
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7. Wash.App., 20 Wash.App. 117, 579 P.2d 980 
(1978). 
8. Martin v. Pickering, 85 Wash.2d 241, 533 
P.2d 380 (1975). 
9. 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 176, citing In re 
Flynn's Estate, 181 Wash. 284, 43 P.2d 8 
(1935). 
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Admittedly, damages for inconvenience, 
annoyance, discomfort and mental distress 
are not capable of precise calculation, al-
though those elements may reflect direct, 
immediate, and real injury. In this case the 
jury had evidence before it to justify the 
award of substantial damages of the type 
under consideration. The Branches testi-
fied to the emotional distress caused Jeanne 
Branch which culminated in her leaving her 
husband for a period of three or four 
months. In addition to that, the Branches 
were forced to truck water onto their prop-
erty and to take numerous other steps to 
counter the nuisance created by Western. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court in all respects 
except with respect to the striking of the 
award of damages for mental distress, an-
noyance, and discomfort and remand for 
the re-entry of that award in the amount 
specified by the jury. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ., 
concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Barbara LIMA, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Earl CHAMBERS, Defendant 
and Respondent, 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUAL-
TY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
No. 17622. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 26, 1982. 
Automobile liability insurance carrier 
providing uninsured motorist coverage 
sought to intervene as of right as party 
defendant in tort action between its insured 
and uninsured motorist tort-feasor. The 
Second District Court, Weber County, Ron-
ald 0. Hyde, J., denied intervention, and 
carrier appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that carrier could inter-
vene. 
Reversed. 
1. Parties <s=>40(7) 
Automobile liability insurance carrier 
providing uninsured motorist coverage may 
intervene as of right as party defendant in 
tort action between its insured and an unin-
sured motorist tort-feasor. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1. 
2. Parties e=>41 
In determining whether intervention as 
of right is mandated, adequacy of represen-
tation generally turns on whether there is 
identity or divergence of interest between 
potential intervenor and original party and 
on whether that interest is diligently repre-
sented. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 24, 24(a), 
(a)(2). 
3. Parties <@=>41 
In determining whether intervention as 
of right is mandated, representation is con-
sidered to be inadequate if original party is 
not diligent in prosecution or defense of 
action or allows default judgment to be 
entered. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 24, 24(a), 
(aX2). 
4. Parties <s=»41 
Rule governing intervention as of right 
should be liberally construed to achieve pur-
pose of eliminating unnecessary duplication 
of litigation. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24. 
5. Parties ®=*40(7) 
Because applicable section requires in-
surers to assume financial responsibility for 
judgments obtained by their insureds 
against uninsured motorist tort-feasors and 
because of insurer's contractual obligation 
which embodies that statutory requirement, 
insurer "is or may be bound" by tort judg-
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ment within meaning of rule providing for 
intervention of parties as of right. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1. 
6. Parties <3=>48 
When intervention is permitted, inter-
venor must accept pending action as he 
finds it; his right to litigate is only as broad 
as that of other parties to the action. 
7. Trial <®=>127 
Identity of intervening insurance com-
pany should be made known to jury in tort 
action between insured and uninsured mo-
torist tort-feasor, and intervening insurer 
must disclose to its insured that their re-
spective interests may be conflicting. 
8. Witnesses <s=>196 
Intervening insurer in tort action be-
tween insured and uninsured motorist tort-
feasor must not be allowed to use against 
its insured any information whatsoever 
gained by reason of insurer-insured rela-
tionship. 
9. Attorney and Client <s=>20 
If intervening insurer in tort action 
between insured and uninsured motorist 
tort-feasor has obligation to defend insured, 
for example as a defendant on counterclaim 
by uninsured motorist, insured should be 
allowed to choose his own independent 
counsel who must then be compensated by 
insurer. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24; U.C.A. 
1953, 41-12-21.1. 
Timothy R. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for 
intervenor and appellant. 
David Bert Havas, pro se. 
STEWART, Justice: 
[1] On this appeal we decide whether an 
automobile liability insurance carrier pro-
viding uninsured motorist coverage may in-
tervene as of right as a party defendant in 
a tort action between its insured and an 
uninsured motorist tortfeasor. The trial 
court denied intervention; we reverse. 
The facts are not in dispute. In July of 
1977 plaintiff, Barbara Lima, was involved 
in an automobile collision with defendant 
Earl Chambers, an uninsured motorist. 
Lima brought a negligence action against 
Chambers, an answer was filed, and dis-
covery ensued. Thereafter, Chambers' at-
torney withdrew from the case. The fol-
lowing day Chambers executed an affidavit 
prepared by plaintiff's attorney acknowl-
edging that he was uninsured and admit-
ting that he had caused the collision with 
plaintiff Lima. On the basis of that admis-
sion, plaintiff moved for and obtained a 
summary judgment on the issue of defend-
ant's liability, leaving the question of dam-
ages to be decided at trial. Thereafter, 
plaintiff's liability insurer, Prudential Prop-
erty & Casualty Insurance Company (Pru-
dential), which is contractually liable for a 
judgment against an uninsured motorist, 
moved to intervene as a party defendant in 
the litigation of the damages issue. Appar-
ently considering our prior decision in Kes-
ler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355, 502 P.2d 565 
(1972), to be controlling, the trial court de-
nied the motion to intervene. 
Prudential appeals, urging that we over-
rule Kesler and allow intervention because 
(1) it will be bound by a judgment against 
the uninsured motorist and denial of inter-
vention therefore violates its constitutional 
right to due process; and (2) Rule 24, Utah 
R.Civ.P., governing intervention, entitles it 
to intervene as of right. Plaintiff Lima 
counters that Kesler was decided correctly, 
that Prudential has only a potential con-
tractual obligation to plaintiff with no in-
terest in the pending tort action, and there-
fore, that neither due process nor Rule 24 
requires Prudential's intervention. 
I. 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 41-12-21.1 re-
quires that automobile liability insurance 
policies include coverage for accidents with 
uninsured motorists: 
[N]o automobile liability insurance policy 
insuring against loss resulting from liabil-
ity imposed by law for bodily injury or 
death or property damage suffered by 
any person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, 
shall be delivered . . . unless coverage is 
provided in such policy 
tection of persons insured thereunder 
who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles and hit-and-run mo-
tor vehicles because of bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease, including death, resulting 
therefrom. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, if an insured is injured by an unin-
sured motorist, the insured may recover 
damages from his own insurance company 
upon showing that he is "legally entitled" 
to recover those damages from the unin-
sured tortfeasor. This showing of legal en-
titlement typically entails a lawsuit against 
the uninsured tortfeasor to litigate the is-
sues of liability and damages. A judgment 
favorable to the insured fixes the insurer's 
contractual duty to satisfy that judgment, 
within the policy limits. The insurer is then 
left to pursue its subrogation remedy 
against the uninsured tortfeasor. 
Because of the direct effect of the tort 
litigation on the insurer's contractual duty, 
both insureds and insurers have sought, un-
der certain circumstances, to involve the 
insurer in the tort litigation. Insureds have 
pressed for intervention to make the tort 
judgment binding on the insurer, and insur-
ers have sought intervention to make cer-
tain the tort issues are fully and fairly 
litigated. Three different attempts have 
been made in this Court to involve an unin-
sured motorist insurance carrier in the tort 
litigation between the insured and the unin-
sured tortfeasor. 
The first attempt was in Christensen v. 
Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 
(1971). There we held that to avoid the 
disclosure of insurance coverage to the jury, 
to prevent the mixture of a contract action 
with a tort action, and to avoid placing the 
insurer in a position hostile to its own in-
sured, a plaintiff could not join its insurer 
as a party defendant in the tort action 
against the uninsured tortfeasor. The fol-
lowing year in Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 
355, 502 P.2d 565 (1972), we addressed the 
precise issue raised again on this appeal: 
Whether the insurer may, on its own mo-
tion, intervene as a party defendant in the 
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between the insured and the 
uninsured tortfeasor. There we concluded 
that Christensen v. Peterson was control-
ling and, without discussing whether the 
requirements of Rule 24 were satisfied, held 
that the insurer could not intervene. Most 
recently, in Wright v. Brown, Utah, 574 
P.2d 1154 (1978), we held that the nonparty 
insurer lacked standing to appeal the de-
fault judgment entered in favor of the in-
sured against the uninsured tortfeasor. 
Thus, one-by-one we have closed all three 
doors to possible insurer participation in the 
tort litigation and have thereby effectively 
precluded the insurer from ensuring that its 
contractual obligation is properly and fairly 
invoked. As the law now stands, the insur-
er may not be joined, may not intervene, 
and may not appeal. We are here asked to 
open only the door of intervention. 
II. 
The overwhelming majority of courts 
have allowed an uninsured motorist insur-
ance carrier to intervene in a tort action 
between its insured and an uninsured tort-
feasor. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala. 
424, 304 So.2d 583 (1974); State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga. 
App. 650, 152 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Wert v. 
Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453, 197 N.E.2d 717 
(1964); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind. 
App. 297, 265 N.E.2d 419 (1970); Rawlins v. 
Stanley, 207 Kan. 564, 486 P.2d 840 (1971); 
Barry v. Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971); 
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 
(1963), Dominici v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 
Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964); 
Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 
606 (1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh, 85 
Nev. 310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969); Kirouac v. 
Healey, 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962); 
Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., Okl, 553 P.2d 153 
(1976); Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mutu-
al Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 468 S.W.2d 727 
(1971). See also 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile 
Insurance § 331 (1980); Annot., 95 A.L. 
R.2d 1330 (1964); Comment, Insurer Inter-
vention in Uninsured Motorist Cases, 55 
Ind.L.J. 717 (1980). The weight of these 
authorities is sufficient to persuade us to 
reevaluate our construction of Rule 24, 
upon which the outcome of this case rests. 
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Intervention of right is asserted m this 
case under Rule 24(a)(2).1 By the terms of 
that rule, an applicant must be allowed to 
intervene if four requirements are met: 1) 
the application is timely; 2) the applicant 
has an interest in the subject matter of the 
dispute; 3) that interest is or may be inade-
quately represented; and 4) the applicant is 
or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action. The timeliness of the application to 
intervene in the hearing on damages in this 
case has not been challenged and is deemed 
satisfied. The remaining requirements are 
discussed in order. 
1. To justify intervention, the party 
seeking intervention must demonstrate a 
direct interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation such that the intervenor's rights 
may be affected, for good or for ill. In 
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 
(1963), the court stated: 
[The required] interest does not include a 
mere, consequential, remote or conjectu-
ral possibility of being in some manner 
affected by the result of the original ac-
tion. It must be such a direct claim upon 
the subject matter of the action that the 
intervenor will either gain or lose by di-
rect operation of the judgment to be ren-
dered. 
Id. at 346. See also State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga.App. 
650, 152 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1966); Commercial 
Block Realty Co. v. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081 
(1934). 
The court in State v. Craig, supra, held 
that an insurer providing uninsured motor-
ist insurance has such a direct and immedi-
ate interest because the insurer "should 
have the right to dispute the questions 
which make it liable on its contract." 364 
S.W.2d at 347. Heisner v.'Jones, 184 Neb. 
602, 169 N W.2d 606 (1969), relied on that 
same interest in allowing intervention: 
It is apparent that the questions litigated 
[in] the action between the insured and 
1. Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right Upon time-
ly application anyone shall be permitted to in-
tervene in an action (2) when the represen-
tation of the applicant's interest by existing 
the uninsured tort-feasor, for liability and 
damages, are the identical issues which 
determine liability of Protective under 
the insurance policy and which give rise 
to Protective^ contractual duty to pay 
the insured. Protective has a direct in-
terest in the matter of litigation within 
the meaning of our intervention statute. 
169 N.W.2d at 611. Vernon Fire and Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind.App. 45, 351 
N.E.2d 60 (1976), identified the interest in 
similar terms: 
Clearly the basis of the action by Mat-
ney [insured] against Vernon [insurer] is 
contractual. However, any action on the 
contract is inseparably tied to the legal 
liability of Thorns [uninsured tortfeasor]. 
Therefore, the initial action in which the 
liability of Thorns is determined is but the 
first link in an unbroken chain leading to 
the contractual liability of Vernon. 
Id. 351 N.E.2d at 64. See also Continental 
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 115 Ga.App. 667, 155 
S.E.2d 713, 715 (1967). In requiring the 
insurer to pay its insured what the insured 
is "legally entitled" to recover from the 
uninsured tortfeasor, within the limits of 
the insured's policy, the legislature must 
have intended that the insurer would "take 
whatever legal steps were necessary and 
fitting to insure that the judgment 
against the uninsured motorist was 
rendered on legal and sufficient evidence." 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. 
Glover, 113 Ga.App. 815, 820, 149 S.E.2d 
852, 856 (1966). 
We agree with the reasoning of the au-
thorities cited and conclude that since the 
extent of Prudential's contractual liability 
to its insured will be determined by the 
amount of damages awarded to its insured 
in the tort action, Prudential stands to lose 
by the operation of that judgment, and 
therefore has sufficient interest in that ac-
tion to justify intervention. 
2. The next issue is whether Pruden-
tial's interest is or may be inadequately 
parties is or may be inadequate and the appli-
cant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action. 
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represented by the existing parties. Since 
Prudential, if allowed, would intervene as a 
party defendant, the question is narrowed 
to whether the uninsured motorist, Cham-
bers, would adequately represent Pruden-
tial's interest in actively litigating the issue 
of damages. Prudential argues that its in-
terest is inadequately represented because 
Chambers lacks the assistance of counsel 
and proposes to litigate the damages issue 
pro se. Because of Chambers' ready admis-
sion of liability resulting in the summary 
judgment establishing Chambers' liability, 
Prudential has a reasonable basis for antici-
pating that the damages issue will not be 
fully and fairly litigated without Chambers' 
personal liability for the judgment provides 
sufficient incentive to keep the damages 
low. Lima also argues that the burden of 
proof placed on him, coupled with the close 
supervision of the trial court, will ensure a 
just judgment. 
[2] Adequacy of representation general-
ly turns on whether there is an identity or 
divergence of interest between the poten-
tial intervenor and an original party and on 
whether that interest is diligently repre-
sented. Alsbach v. Bader, Mo.App., 616 
S.W.2d 147,151 (1981); Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 
1412 (1962). Generally, where the appli-
cant's interest is different from that of an 
existing party, the applicant's interest is 
not represented. While Prudential's inter-
est appears on the surface to be the same as 
Chambers', the interests are likely diver-
gent. Chambers' primary interest appears 
to be not in minimizing damages, but in 
bringing the whole matter to a close as soon 
as possible, with little regard for the 
amount of damages awarded. In this case, 
litigation of the damage issue by Chambers 
on a pro se basis does not provide adequate 
representation of Prudential's interest. Al-
though Chambers will be personally liable 
for the judgment and technically obligated 
to reimburse Prudential, that does not suf-
fice to assure adequate representation of 
Prudential's interest. 
[3] Closely related to the question of 
similarity of interests is whether the inter-
est of the applicant, even if assumed to be 
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represented, is represented diligently. Rep-
resentation is considered to be inadequate if 
the original party is not diligent in the 
prosecution or defense of the action or al-
lows a default judgment to be entered. 
Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 5 (1962). 
The close cooperation between plaintiff and 
defendant in resolving the liability issue in 
this case evidences an absence of the ad-
verse relationship essential to a full and fair 
litigation of the damage issue. Moreover, 
whereas a disinterested attitude of counsel 
for an uninsured motorist may affect the 
diligence of representation, an absence of 
counsel for Chambers in the instant case 
creates a strong presumption against ade-
quate representation. Proper representa-
tion would undoubtedly be hampered fur-
ther by Chambers' apparent inability to 
read. 
Finally, we reject plaintiff Lima's argu-
ment that a fair result is ensured by her 
having to meet the burden of proof and by 
court supervision. Neither position has 
merit. The burden of proof requirement is 
effective only when a case is actually and 
fairly litigated m a truly adversarial trial. 
As for court supervision, we need only re-
mark that it is not the role of a judge to be 
an advocate. Such a concept is fundamen-
tally contrary to the nature of our adver-
sary system. The court in State v. Craig, 
Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 (1963), responded 
in like manner to the suggestion that the 
interests of a defaulting defendant (and 
hence the interests of the potential interve-
nor) were adequately protected by the 
court: 
We think the argument that relator's 
interest will be "adequately represented" 
in respect to Count I because the court 
will require proof of plaintiff's cause is 
specious. It is not the duty of the trial 
court to subpoena and interrogate wit-
nesses who might contradict the testimo-
ny of plaintiffs or those who might testi-
fy to compelling facts which show that 
plaintiff is not "legally entitled to recov-
er" the damages he claims. The court 
cannot, and should not, act as attorney 
for the defaulting defendants. Every 
Utah Rep 656-659 P2d—7 
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practicing lawyer knows that, in so far as 
the issues of fact are concerned, the de-
faulting defendants are not "adequately 
represented." 
Id. at 346. 
We therefore conclude that Prudential's 
interest is not adequately represented. 
3. Finally, we must decide whether Pru-
dential is or may be bound by a judgment 
in the tort action. Prudential argues that it 
is "probably bound" by a judgment against 
the uninsured tortfeasor. Plaintiff Lima 
argues that a judgment binds only the de-
fendant Chambers, and not Prudential, 
whose contractual obligation is merely trig-
gered by the tort judgment. 
[4] A major conflict of authority exists 
on the meaning of the word "bound." An-
not, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 6 (1962). Some 
courts have applied a strict interpretation 
requiring a showing that the judgment 
would be res judicata as to petitioner for 
intervention, thus preventing the retrial of 
decided issues. Other courts have applied a 
more liberal construction requiring only a 
showing that the applicant would be bound 
in a practical sense. The federal interven-
tion rule and many states' rules have been 
amended to clear up this ambiguity by de-
leting the "bound" requirement and requir-
ing only that the judgment in some way 
impair the applicant's interest. This con-
struction is now applied in the majority of 
jurisdictions, either under expressly reword-
ed rules of intervention or through a liberal 
construction of the term "is or may be 
bound." We are of the opinion that Rule 24 
should be liberally construed to achieve the 
purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplica-
tion of litigation. Centurian Corp. v. 
Cripps, Utah, 577 P.2d 955 (1978); Bartholo-
mew v. Bartholomew, Utah, 548 P.2d 238 
(1976). The language of the rule requiring 
only that a petitioner show that he "may be 
2. We need not decide whether Prudential might 
be bound by the judgment under the doctrines 
of res judicata or estoppel. That question can-
not arise until it is established that there is a 
right to intervene Presumably, a nonparty in-
surer could not be bound in a res judicata sense 
unless it had the right and opportunity to inter-
vene and chose not to. See Wells v. Hartford 
bound," clearly contemplates that the rule 
should be construed broadly enough to fur-
ther both fairness and economy in judicial 
administration. 
[5] We hold that because section 41-12-
21.1 requires insurers to assume financial 
responsibility for judgments obtained by 
their insureds against uninsured motorist 
tortfeasors (within certain limits), and be-
cause of the insurer's contractual obligation 
which embodies that statutory requirement, 
the insurer "is or may be bound" by the tort 
judgment within the meaning of Rule 24.2 
Having concluded that the four require-
ments for intervention of right have teen 
met, we hold that Prudential should be al-
lowed to intervene in the pending damages 
litigation between its insured and the unin-
sured tortfeasor. Having resolved the issue 
at hand on statutory grounds, we need not 
address Prudential's constitutional argu-
ment concerning denial of due process. 
In allowing intervention in this case, we 
necessarily overrule Kesler v. Tate, supra, 
and thereby partially fulfill Chief Justice 
Hall's foreshadowing comment in Wright v. 
Brown, supra at 1155, that "the time [could 
be] nigh to alter the course of the law as set 
forth in Christensen v. Peterson and Kesler 
v. Tate." 
III. 
We do not hold that in each and every 
uninsured motorist case intervention must 
be allowed. In each case it will be neces-
sary for the trial judge to make an assess-
ment of the adequacy of representation. If 
the defendant has counsel who actively liti-
gates the case, intervention may not be 
appropriate. 
[6-9] When intervention is permitted, 
the intervenor must accept the pending ac-
Accident and Indemnity Co, Mo., 459 S.W.2d 
253 (1970), Alsbach v Bader, Mo.App., 616 
SW.2d 147 (1981), Donunici v. State Farm 
Mut. Ins Co, 143 Mont 406, 390 P2d 806 
(1964), Allstate Ins Co. v Pietrosh, 85 Nev. 
310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969); Indiana Ins Co v. 
Noble, 148 Ind App 297, 265 N.E 2d 419 (1970). 
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tion as he finds it; his right to litigate is 
only as broad as that of the other parties to 
the action. E.g., Beard v. Jackson, Mo. 
App., 502 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1973). The iden-
tity of the intervening insurance company 
should be made known to the jury, and an 
intervening insurer must disclose to its in-
sured that their respective interests may be 
conflicting.3 The insurer must not be al-
lowed to use against its insured any infor-
mation whatsoever gained by reason of the 
insurer-insured relationship. See Barry v. 
Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971). Finally, 
if the insurer has an obligation to defend 
the insured, for example as a defendant on 
a counterclaim by the uninsured motorist, 
the insured should be allowed to choose his 
own independent counsel who must then be 
compensated by the insurer. 
The order of the trial court denying inter-
vention is reversed and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. No costs. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
( O t KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
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In the Matter of the Mental Condition 
of Lewis Lee GILES. 
No. 17976. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 29, 1982. 
Mental patient appealed from ruling of 
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
David Sam, J., ordering his involuntary hos-
pitalization. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that: (1) the action was not mooted by 
3. We recognize that some conflict of interests 
appears to be inevitable However, the interest 
of fairness and judicial economy outweigh, in 
our view, the potential difficulties arising from 
a conflict of interest See, e g., Oliver v Perry, 
293 Ala 424, 304 So 2d 583 (1974). Vernon 
defendant's release from the hospital, and 
(2) necessary elements for involuntary hos-
pitalization existed at time of patient's com-
mitment hearing. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. Action <s=»6 
Doctrine of collateral legal conse-
quences, which is chiefly applied in criminal 
cases where absence or presence of those 
consequences may determine a criminal's 
chance of rehabilitation or recidivism, is 
equally applicable to patients of mental hos-
pitals who face similar deprivations of liber-
ty and whose commitment and hospitaliza-
tion must stand scrutiny on the merits 
when challenged. 
2. Action <s=»6 
In light of collateral consequences that 
may have been imposed upon former men-
tal patient were he to have faced future 
confrontations with legal system, action 
challenging his involuntary civil commit-
ment was not mooted by his release from 
hospital. 
3. Mental Health <s=>439 
In mental patient's action challenging 
his involuntary hospitalization, there was 
evidence from which trial court could have 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, at 
time of his hearing, patient suffered from a 
mental illness as defined by statute, posed 
an immediate danger of physical injury to 
others or himself, and lacked ability to en-
gage in a rational decision-making process 
regarding acceptance of mental treatment, 
that no less restrictive alternative existed 
to a court order of hospitalization, and that 
hospital could provide patient with treat-
ment that was adequate and appropriate to 
his conditions and needs. U.C.A.1953, 
64-7-28(1), 64-7-36(10). 
Fire and Casualty Ins Co v Matney, 170 Ind 
App 45, 351 NE2d 60, 65 (1976), Alsbach v 
Bader, Mo.App, 616 SW2d 147, 153-54 
(1981), Heisner v Jones, 184 Neb 602, 169 
NW 2d 606, 612 (1969) 
J. Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) 
STANGER v. SENTINEL SEC. LIFE INS. CO. Utah 1201 
Cite as 669 PJ2d 1201 (Utah 1983) 
with respect to $7,000 lump-sum payment, 
Kenton L. STANGER; Dale M. Anderson, which salesman sought and used to further 
as the personal representative of the sales production, and thus, in action to re-
Estate of Merlin D. Anderson; and Bal- cover commissions, admission of salesman's 
anced Security Corporation of America, testimony regarding employer's promises 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, did not violate parol evidence rule. 
v. 
SENTINEL SECURITY LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 17757. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 11, 1983. 
Insurance salesmen brought action 
against employer to recover commissions. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., entered judgment 
for salesmen, and employer appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) 
parol evidence was admissible to determine 
parties' intentions regarding repayments of 
promissory note and advances which were 
used for operational expenses of salesman; 
(2) evidence was sufficient to support find-
ing that advances were not intended to be 
repaid, or were not intended to be repaid 
from commissions; and (3) error in calculat-
ing total amount due was "clerical mistake" 
which could be corrected by trial court. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=> 1001(1) 
In reviewing special verdicts, Supreme 
Court will review evidence in light most 
favorable to findings of jury and uphold 
them, so long as there is competent evi-
dence to sustain them. 
2. Evidence <s=>397(2) 
To preserve sanctity of written instru-
ments, intent of parties to written integrat-
ed contract should be found within four 
corners of that instrument. 
3. Evidence <s=»398 
Sales commission contract which was 
silent on matter of lump-sum payments to 
insurance salesman was not an integration 
4. Evidence <s=»445(6) 
In action for commissions, insurance 
salesman's testimony that he had not antici-
pated that he would be required to repay 
advanced $7,000, which he used to further 
sales production, was not an attempt, in 
violation of the parol evidence rule, to alter 
or vary terms of promissory note evidencing 
indebtedness, as testimony showed only 
that parties by subsequent oral agreement 
agreed that note could be discharged in 
some way other than payment in money. 
5. Insurance <s=>84(6) 
In action for commissions, testimony of 
insurance salesman that parties by subse-
quent oral agreement agreed that promisso-
ry note could be discharged by producing 
sales in substantial amount which was satis-
factory to employer, and salesman's uncon-
tradicted testimony that his sales produc-
tion was fully satisfactory to employer, was 
competent evidence from which jury could 
have concluded that salesman had fully dis-
charged note. 
6. Evidence <s=>442(4) 
In action for insurance commissions, 
parol testimony was admissible as to par-
ties' oral agreement that $23,403.95 paid to 
salesman during his second contract year to 
assist covering expenses of his agency was 
not repayable, as employment contract was 
silent on subject. 
7. Insurance <s=>84(6) 
In action to recover insurance sales 
commissions, salesman's testimony that the 
$23,403.95 employer advanced to him to as-
sist in covering expenses of his agency for 
second year of its operation was not to be 
repaid, because employer had agreed to fur-
nish funds to stimulate sales production, 
was competent evidence upon which jury 
could have based their finding of no liabili-
ty of salesman for repayment. 
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8. Evidence <s=>417(10) 
In action for insurance sales commis-
sions, parol evidence was admissible on is-
sue whether $1,000 per month that special 
agent received for 17 months he was em-
ployed by salesman was agreed to be repay-
able by special agent, and thus, was an 
"indebtedness" for which salesman would 
be liable, as agent's contract was silent re-
garding payments. 
9. Insurance <s=>84(6) 
In salesmen's action to recover insur-
ance commissions, evidence that president 
and vice-president of employer stated, be-
fore first of 17 $1,000 payments was made 
to salesman's special agent, that payment 
was not repayable, because it was intended 
to assist agent in changing employers and 
to further development of insurer's busi-
ness, was competent to support jury's find-
ing that amounts were not agreed to be 
repayable; moreover, testimony that special 
agent was not salesman's subagent at time 
payments were made established that debit-
ing salesman's account would be improper 
under salesman's contract. 
10. Insurance <s=>84(2) 
As employer admitted that repayment 
of advanced $13,628.85 was to be made only 
on premiums paid on sales of insurance 
under prior contract, employer's withhold-
ing of that amount from salesman's com-
missions was improper. 
11. Judgment <s=>314 
Award of damages, which was based 
upon erroneous total shown in letter exhib-
it, could be recomputed by court as "clerical 
mistake" under rule permitting trial court 
to correct clerical mistakes in judgments at 
any time. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
John P. Ashton and James A. Boevers, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respon-
dents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiffs sued to recover commissions al-
legedly due them on sales of insurance 
which they claimed were being wrongfully 
withheld by defendant Sentinel. A jury 
returned special verdicts finding that plain-
tiffs were entitled to their commissions, 
that defendant had no contractual right to 
repayment by plaintiffs of certain amounts 
it had "advanced" them and that defendant 
had waived and was estopped from requir-
ing repayment. Defendant moved for 
judgment NOV or for a new trial. The 
motion was denied and defendant appeals. 
On February 15, 1965 plaintiff Merlin D. 
Anderson, together with two other part-
ners, entered into a "Sales Management 
Group Agreement" (SMG Contract) with 
Sentinel. Sentinel had theretofore been 
selling mostly small "burial plan" policies, 
but planned an expansion into the sale of 
large ordinary life insurance policies. An-
derson and plaintiff Kenton L. Stanger had 
previously been successful managers and 
agents affiliated with Farm Bureau—Coun-
try Mutual Life Insurance Co. Stanger 
signed a separate "General Agent's Con-
tract" (Stanger Contract) with Sentinel on 
March 1, 1965. Both contracts covered the 
agents' authority, their territory, and the 
payment of commissions. Only the SMG 
Contract contained a provision on the pay-
ment of expenses of the Sales Management 
Group which read as follows: 
The Company may from time to time 
pay expenses of the Sales Management 
Group or sub-agents and if such expenses 
are paid, such practice shall not create a 
right in Sales Management Group or sub-
agent to require such payment and the 
Company may make agreements from 
time to time that said advancements may 
be reimbursable or nonreimbursable and 
if such arrangements are made they shall 
not set a precedent. 
On March 10, 1965, Stanger received 
$7,000 from Sentinel and executed a prom-
issory note in that amount, payable in 
amounts of not less than $100.00 per month. 
Stanger complained that he did not like the 
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payment provision, but was told by Sentinel 
that it needed the note to get the payment 
passed by the Board. Stanger used the 
entire amount to develop new insurance 
business for Sentinel. When Sentinel be-
gan withholding monthly installments from 
Stanger's accrued commissions, Stanger im-
mediately complained because he had been 
told that the note would not be a debit. 
Sentinel informed him at that time that if 
his production was substantial and to Senti-
nel's satisfaction, the note would not have 
to be repaid. The withholding of install-
ments from commissions ceased in the fall 
of that year. 
In April of 1965 Stanger signed up as 
Sentinel's special agent Robert Ipsen, who 
for the next 17 months received $1,000 per 
month advances from Sentinel for the de-
velopment of the Arizona territory. Under 
the Stanger Contract, the general agent 
was responsible for any indebtedness aris-
ing under contract of all sub-agents under 
his authority. Sentinel initially withheld 
$1,000 as a debit against earned monthly 
commissions from Ipsen's account. When 
Ipsen complained, on similar grounds as 
Stanger, that these were not to be reim-
bursable expenses, the practice was discon-
tinued as against him, but the $17,000 later 
appeared as a debit item on Stanger's 
account. Stanger testified, and Sentinel 
admitted, that at the time these sums were 
advanced to Ipsen, he was a special agent 
under Stanger's regional supervision, but 
not his sub-agent. 
In 1966, additional cash flow was re-
quired by Stanger to pay expenses and con-
tinue the operation of his insurance agency. 
Stanger negotiated monthly payments of 
$2,000 with Sentinel through the second 
year of his contract. These again started to 
show up as debits on the commission state-
ments. Upon complaint, Stanger was told 
that this method was necessary to reflect 
an accounting on the books and that Senti-
nel considered these sums developmental 
allowances which had nothing to do with 
regular advances against commissions. The 
practice of withholding these amounts was 
stopped immediately. No further amounts 
were withheld from Stanger's commissions 
between late 1965 and 1975. 
On January 13, 1969 the SMG Contract 
was superseded by a Modification Agree-
ment resulting from the transfer of Ander-
son's two partners to employee status with 
Sentinel. In that agreement the actual 
debit balance for the Sales Management 
Group was established at $93,285.26. Senti-
nel and the Sales Management Group 
agreed that there would be no further over-
writes earned under the old SMG Contract 
for business produced after January 1,1969, 
and that only overwrites accruing in the 
future from business produced prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1969 would be applied to liquidate 
the debit balance on the SMG account. 
On March 1, 1969 Stanger and Anderson 
as co-agents and Sentinel entered into a 
new General Agent's Contract and Adden-
dum to General Agent's Contract (Ander-
son-Stanger Contract). The account creat-
ed as a result of the Anderson-Stanger Con-
tract was denominated "001," whereas 
Stanger's previous account was "439," and 
Anderson's under the SMG Contract was 
"461." Sentinel conceded that under the 
Modification Agreement the alleged debits 
of Anderson could have been withheld only 
from account "461." However, all sums 
contested in this action were withheld from 
Stanger and Anderson from the "001" 
account. Sentinel bases its right to with-
hold on language contained in each of the 
Stanger, SMG, and Anderson-Stanger Con-
tracts as follows: 
Any debt due from or charged payable 
by, the General Agent to the Company, 
by virtue of this contract or otherwise, 
shall be a first lien on all commissions 
and benefits accrued hereunder. 
The jury returned special verdicts with 
damages of $27,016.40 to Stanger and An-
derson, or a total of $54,032.80. That 
amount was intended to be the total of the 
four items listed in defendants' Exhibit D-
73, a letter addressed by Sentinel's account-
ant to its counsel explaining the items Sen-
tinel had withheld from Stanger's and An-
derson's commissions. That letter reads: 
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March 25, 1981 
Dear Dwight: 
Per your request, please find below my 
anaylsis [sic] of the major differences be-
tween Mr. Stanger's accounting and mine. 
$53,745.63 Credit balances claimed by Mr. Stanger 
+ 106.00 Net Debit Balances per Sentinel 
$53,851.63 Accounting Difference as of 2-28-81 
1. $ 7,000.00 
2. 23,403.95 
3. 17,000.00 
4. 13,628.85 
$54,032.80 
1. The $7,000.00 represents the note exe-
cuted in 1965. 
2. The $23,403.95 represents advances to 
Mr. Stanger during his 2nd contract year of 
February 1966 through January 1967. 
3. $17,000.00 represents advances to Rob-
ert Ipsen as sub-agent of Mr, Stanger dur-
ing period of June 1965 through February 
1967. 
4. $13,628.85 represents Merlin Anderson's 
share of Debit created while partner of 
Sentinel Sales Management Group. 
As is shown these major items account for 
all but $181.17 of the differences. 
Fred G. Cheney 
Accountant 
As can be seen on the face of the letter, 
the sum total of items 1-4 through clerical 
error omitted the contested promissory note 
in the sum of $7,000.00, which, when includ-
ed, brings the amount of withholdings to 
$61,032.80. The amounts set forth in that 
letter and claimed as debits appeared as 
subsidies and investments in some of Senti-
nel's corporate documents. The record also 
indicates that in 1969 the SentineJ Board of 
Directors was informed that expenses for-
merly chargeable to individual agents' 
accounts were to be treated as company 
expenses. Sentinel did not adduce any evi-
dence in support of its theory that the 
monies were advanced under a reimbursa-
ble "bridge-plan" which tides new salesmen 
over until such time as commissions are 
generated. None of the contracts contained 
such a provision, and only the SMG Con-
tract provides for Sentinel's unilateral dis-
cretion to advance expenses from time to 
time, and to make them reimbursable or 
non-reimbursable. 
[1] In reviewing the special verdicts in 
favor of the plaintiffs, we will review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
findings of the jury, Williams v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., Utah, 656 P.2d 966 (1982) and 
uphold them, so long as there is competent 
evidence to sustain them. Time Commer-
cial Financing Corp. v. Davis, Utah, 657 
P.2d 234 (1982) and cases therein cited. 
Sentinel contends that both Stanger and 
Anderson were bound by their written 
agreements as a matter of law, that the 
agreements were integrations and were in-
tended by the parties to embody all of their 
agreements. Thus Sentinel assails the ad-
mission by the trial court of parol evidence 
of the intentions of the contracting parties 
with respect to the various items and 
amounts Sentinel had withheld. We will 
examine each of the four items against this 
contention: 
(1) The $7,000 promissory note. Stanger 
testified that soon after he entered into the 
Stanger Contract on March 1,1965 he found 
that the $500 per month which Sentinel 
agreed to pay him for one year (without 
any obligation of repayment) to assist in 
the payment of the expenses of setting up 
his agency and developing business was in-
adequate because his agency was larger 
than most. He met with E. LaVar Tate, 
president of Sentinel, and requested addi-
tional monies. Tate responded that he 
thought he could work something out. 
Shortly thereafter, Sentinel mailed Stanger 
a check for $7,000, which was enclosed with 
the promissory note which Stanger was re-
quested to execute and return. Stanger did 
so, but shortly thereafter complained to 
Tate that he had not anticipated that he 
would be required to repay the money. 
Tate replied that he needed the note to get 
the payment approved by the Board of Di-
rectors. Stanger used the funds to further 
sales production such as secretarial help, 
office expenses and recruiting salesmen. 
When the $7,000 appeared as a debit on one 
of Stanger's monthly commission state-
ments from Sentinel, he again protested to 
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Tate. Tate reiterated that that was Senti-
nel's method of accounting but that if Stan-
ger's production was substantial and Senti-
nel was satisfied with it, the note would not 
have to be repaid. 
[2,3] To preserve the sanctity of writ-
ten instruments, the intent of the parties to 
a written integrated contract should be 
found within the four corners of that in-
strument. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 
Utah, 636 P.2d 1060 (1981). The Stanger 
Contract was silent on the matter of lump 
sum payments to Stanger such as the 
$7,000. The contract therefore was not an 
integration with respect to the $7,000 since 
it contained no provision that a lump sum 
of money would be made available by Senti-
nel nor whether it would have to be repaid. 
Therefore, the admission of Stanger's testi-
mony regarding Tate's representations and 
promises did not violate the parol evidence 
rule as varying the terms of an integrated 
contract. 
The doctrine of partial integration is that 
where a written contract is obviously not, 
or is shown not to be, the complete con-
tract, parol evidence not inconsistent with 
the writing is admissible to show what 
the entire contract really was, by supple-
menting, as distinguished from contra-
dicting, the writing. In such a case parol 
evidence to prove the part not reduced to 
writing is admissible, although it is not 
admissible as to the part reduced to writ-
ing. 
30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 1043. 
In a somewhat similar fact situation the 
Supreme Court of Iowa in Forbes v. Chica-
go, R.I. & P.R. Co., 150 Iowa 177, 129 N.W. 
810 (1911) held that where a written con-
tract employing an attorney is silent on the 
subject, parol evidence is admissible to show 
who is chargeable with certain expenses in 
conducting a suit. See also North Ameri-
can Uranium, Inc. v. Johnston, 77 Wyo. 332, 
316 P.2d 325 (1957). 
[4,5] Nor was there an attempt here to 
alter or vary the terms of the note. The 
testimony of Stanger only showed that the 
parties by a subsequent oral agreement 
agreed that the note could be discharged in 
some way other than payment in money. 
That way was by producing sales in a sub-
stantial amount which was satisfactory to 
Sentinel. Stanger further testified that his 
sales production was indeed good and fully 
satisfactory to Sentinel. Sentinel did not 
claim otherwise. Therefore, there was com-
petent evidence from which the jury could 
have concluded that Stanger had fully dis-
charged the note. 
[6,7] (2) The $28,403.95 paid to Stanger 
during his second contract year. This 
amount is the balance which Sentinel 
claimed was owing from payments of $2,000 
which were made to Stanger to assist cover-
ing expenses of his agency for the second 
year of its operation. As with the promis-
sory note, the Stanger Contract was silent 
on the subject of this item and therefore 
the contract cannot be considered an inte-
gration of the agreement of the parties 
concerning whether it should be repaid or 
not. Parol testimony was therefore admis-
sible as to the parties' oral agreement that 
this amount was not repayable. The evi-
dence was conflicting with Stanger con-
tending that they were not to be repaid 
because Sentinel had agreed to furnish the 
funds to stimulate sales production. This 
was competent evidence upon which the 
jury could have based their finding of no 
liability. 
[8,9] (3) Payments to Robert Ipsen of 
$17,000. Sentinel claimed the right to with-
hold this amount from Stanger's commis-
sions because in the second amendment to 
the Stanger contract it was provided: 
The general agent shall be responsible for 
the indebtedness of all agents under his 
authority which has arisen from said 
agent's contracts and which have been 
created while under his authority. 
Sentinel urges that under this provision 
Stanger was liable as a matter of law for 
the repayment of th* $17,000. That argu-
ment, however, overlooks the fact that Ip-
sen's contract with Sentinel was silent re-
garding the $1,000 per month Ipsen re-
ceived for the 17 months he was employed. 
Here again, as was the case with Items 1 
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and 2, the written contract was not an 
integration as to this subject. Therefore, 
whether the $17,000 was agreed to be re-
payable by Ipsen and thus an "indebted-
ness" for which Stanger would be liable 
became a question of fact and parol evi-
dence was admissible. While the evidence 
was conflicting, Stanger adduced testimony 
that the president and vice president of 
Sentinel stated before the first payment 
was made to Ipsen that it was not repaya-
ble because it was intended to assist him in 
changing employers and to further the de-
velopment of Sentinel's business in Arizona. 
There being competent evidence to support 
the jury's finding on this issue, we will not 
disturb it. Moreover, there was also testi-
mony that Ipsen was not Stanger's sub-
agent at the time the payments were made 
and therefore the debiting of Stanger's 
account would be improper under the Stan-
ger Contract. 
[10] (4) $13,628.85, representing Ander-
son's share of debit created while operating 
under the SMG Contract. At the trial the 
president of Sentinel agreed with Stanger 
and Anderson that the repayment of this 
amount was expressly covered by the Modi-
fication Agreement of January 13, 1969, 
and that under the terms thereof only pre-
miums paid on sales of insurance under the 
SMG Contract prior to 1969 would be used 
to reduce and eventually eliminate Ander-
son's debit balance. The $13,628.85 with-
held from the "001" account represented, 
according to the breakdown provided by 
Sentinel, Anderson's share of debit created 
while a partner under the SMG Contract. 
In view of this recognition by Sentinel, the 
trial court could have ruled as a matter of 
law that Sentinel's withholding of this 
amount was improper. 
In sum, it was proper to admit parol 
evidence extrinsic to the Stanger Contract 
and the evidence so admitted clearly sup-
ports the factual findings of the jury that 
Sentinel had no contractual rights to with-
hold any of the sums hereinabove referred 
to from Stanger for the reasons we have 
given. As to Anderson, Sentinel conceded 
it was not permitted to charge the "001" 
account for funds advanced him during the 
initial four year period of his relationship 
with Sentinel. The jury observed the wit-
nesses, heard their testimony, and it was 
their exclusive province to weigh the evi-
dence in deciding in favor of one side or the 
other. 
We have reviewed Sentinel's contention 
with respect to the jury instruction on Sen-
tinel's first lien right on all commissions for 
debts due and the issues of estoppel and 
waiver. Inasmuch as the jury found, and 
we have affirmed their finding, that Senti-
nel had no contractual right to sums with-
held from commissions, that finding is dis-
positive of this appeal and we deem it un-
necessary to address those issues. 
[11] One point, however, remains to be 
addressed. As noted above, the jury uti-
lized Sentinel's calculation of amounts with-
held from commissions to arrive at an 
award of damages of $27,016.40 to each 
Anderson and Stanger, based upon the total 
of $54,032.80 shown in the above letter ex-
hibit. In fact, the correct total was $61,-
032.80, which would make a total award of 
$30,516.40 to each of the two plaintiffs. 
Under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court may correct cleri-
cal mistakes in judgments at any time. See 
also Bagnall v. Suburbia & Co., Utah, 579 
P.2d 917 (1978). In explanation of the in-
tent of the identical Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure, the comment has been made 
that "in this broad approach to correctibili-
ty under Rule 60(a), it matters little wheth-
er an error was made by the court clerk, the 
jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge 
himself, so long as it is clearly a formal 
error that should be corrected in the inter-
est of having judgment, order, or other part 
of the record reflect what was done or 
intended." Annot., 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 
(1972). The definition of "clerical mistake" 
thus extends to include the one here discov-
ered. "It is a type of mistake or omission 
mechanical in nature which is apparent on 
the record and which does not involve a 
legal decision or judgment by an attorney." 
In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266 
F.Supp. 605, 607 (1967). Our instruction to 
NELSON v. 
Cite as 669 P^d 
the district court to correct the incorrect 
total amount of judgment, where the mis-
take is clear from the record, reflects no 
more than what plaintiffs are entitled to 
under the verdict. Accord Fay v. Harris, 64 
Ariz. 10, 164 P.2d 860 (1945). 
The judgment on the special verdicts is 
affirmed in all respects. The case is re-
manded to the trial court for the limited 
purpose of correcting the amount of dam-
ages to reflect an award of $30,516.40 to 
each of the plaintiffs. Costs awarded to 
plaintiffs. 
HALL, CJ., STEWART and OAKS, J J , 
and DAVID SAM, District Judge, concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein. 
DAVID SAM, District Judge, sat. 
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Brett W. NELSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Jeff JACOBSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 17667. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 31, 1983. 
Action was instituted for alleged alien-
ation of wife's affections. The Sixth Dis-
trict Court, Sanpete County, Don V. Tibbs, 
J., entered judgment for plaintiff, and de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Oaks, J., held that: (1) notice of trial de-
scribed nature of proceedings against un-
represented defendant in such ambiguous 
terms that it deprived him of adequate time 
to prepare for his defense in violation of his 
right to due process; (2) an action for alien-
ation of affections was still a viable cause 
of action in Utah, but in order for plaintiff 
JACOBSEN Utah 1207 
1207 (Utah 1983) 
to recover, it was necessary to establish 
that causal effect of defendant's conduct 
outweighed combined effect of all other 
causes, including conduct of plaintiff and 
alienated spouse; (3) punitive damages 
were recoverable as long as plaintiff 
showed circumstances of aggravation in ad-
dition to malice implied by law from con-
duct of defendant in causing separation of 
plaintiff and his spouse; and (4) an award 
of punitive damages could not be entered, 
however, without first adducing evidence or 
making findings of fact with regard to de-
fendant's net worth or income. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., and Stewart, J., concurred in 
part and dissented in part and filed sepa-
rate opinions. 
Durham, J., concurred in result and 
dissented in part and filed opinion. 
1. Constitutional Law <s=>251.6 
A party is deprived of due process 
where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to 
inform a party of nature of proceeding 
against him or is not given sufficiently in 
advance of proceeding to permit prepara-
tion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
2. Constitutional Law <s=»251.6 
To satisfy an essential requisite of pro-
cedural due process, a "hearing" must be 
prefaced by timely notice which adequately 
informs the parties of the specific issues 
they must prepare to meet. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
3. Constitutional Law <s=>251.5 
"Due process" is not a technical concept 
that can be reduced to a formula with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and 
circumstances, but is a concept which rests 
upon basic fairness and demands a proce-
dure that is appropriate to case and just to 
parties involved. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
14. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
K. State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1991) 
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int in Brewer, 
t Innis "was 
appeal to his 
fety of handi-
here anything 
iat the police 
sually disori-
f his arrest." 
S.Ct. at 1690. 
[8] Similar to Innis, the conversation 
between the agents transporting Singer 
was very brief, comprising only a few sen-
tences of off-hand remarks. Singer claims 
that because the bombing and siege result-
ed from difficulties experienced by his own 
family, the agents' comments about "fami-
ly" were purposefully intended to be the 
functional equivalent of interrogation. We 
disagree. The agents' comments can most 
fairly be construed in the context of two 
fatigued officers who had been working 
long shifts at all hours of the day and 
night, while separated from spouses and 
children. Even when generously viewed 
from Singer's perspective, nothing in the 
record suggests that the agents' pining for 
their own homes and families represented 
anything other than what the trial court 
concluded it was—the natural expression of 
familial sentiment. 
Singer's decision to relate the story of 
the siege from his standpoint came within a 
very few minutes of a full explanation and 
recitation of his rights, accompanied by his 
signed waiver. His change of heart fol-
lowed a brief interpersonal exchange be-
tween the two agents—not a lengthy emo-
tional discourse focused toward Singer. 
The agents honored Singer's request to 
remain silent and ceased questioning until 
Singer injected himself into the conversa-
tion and voluntarily related his tale. We 
hold that no violation of Singer's right to 
remain silent occurred, as Singer voluntar-
ily abandoned his privilege against self-
11. The State also urges us to follow the rule of 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 VS. 96, 96 S.Ct 321, 46 
L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), where the Supreme Court 
held that a second interrogation following two 
hours after the initial invocation of Miranda 
rights, and addressing a crime unrelated to that 
for which defendant was arrested, did not vio-
incrimination under circumstances not 
amounting to interrogation.11 
CONCLUSION 
Singer was properly convicted of man-
slaughter. The evidence presented was 
sufficient to demonstrate that Singer acted 
recklessly in firing the shot which killed 
Lieutenant Fred House. Singer's state-
ments to law enforcement officers were not 
obtained through coercive interrogation or 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Ac-
cordingly, Singer's conviction is affirmed. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Joseph Finano MOYA, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Nos. 890608-CA, 900445-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 17, 1991. 
Defendant appealed from orders of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Scott Daniels, J., revoking probation and 
revising wording of his original sentence. 
The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that 
(1) defendant's 18-month probation period 
was not tolled upon violation of probation, 
and (2) rule governing corrections of cleri-
cal errors could not be applied to revise 
wording of defendant's original sentence to 
stay imposition of probation after 18-
month probationary period expired. 
late Miranda when a new set of warnings was 
administered. Because we do not find Singer's 
Miranda rights to have been violated we do not 
reach this issue. However, we note that unlike 
Mosley, Singer was given no second admonition 
after he initiated conversation with the agents. 
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probation and vacate the order revising 
«-r --I J J- j.- • • defendant's sentence. 
Bench, PJ., filed dissenting opinion. «^«^. 
FACTS 
Reversed and vacated. 
1. Criminal Law <®=>982.7 
Defendant's 18-month probation peri-
od was not tolled upon violation of proba-
tion where violation was not properly acted 
upon in timely fashion. U.C.A.1953, 77-
18-l(10)(a)(1985). 
2. Criminal Law <s=>996(2) 
Rule governing corrections of clerical 
errors could not be applied to revise word-
ing of defendant's original sentence to stay 
imposition of probation after 18-month pro-
bationary period expired. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 60(a). 
James A. Valdez and Ronald S. Fujino 
(argued), Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., and Judith 
S.H. Atherton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Joseph F. Moya appeals from 
an order revoking probation and reimpos-
ing a sentence of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison. Defendant also appeals 
from an order for correction of a clerical 
error, granted pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 
60(a), revising the wording of his original 
sentence. We reverse the order revoking 
1. Because defendant remains on parole from 
the Utah State Prison, any further violation 
might constitute grounds for an immediate re-
turn to prison. Defendant's position is that he 
should never have been imprisoned so he could 
be paroled, since his probation had expired long 
before it was purportedly revoked. 
Although the state suggested at oral argument 
that defendant is presently a fugitive from New 
Mexico and Utah justice systems, nothing in the 
record before us substantiates this claim. 
The facts critical to resolution of this 
appeal are unusually convoluted. The pro-
cedural history of the case is tangled with 
defendant's turnstile entries and exits from 
Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona, in whose 
jails and prisons he has been a frequent 
resident over the past several years. The 
state concedes its position on appeal "has 
problems" and would welcome a determina-
tion of mootness and dismissal of the ap-
peal. However, the potential for further 
mischief resulting from the sentence im-
posed upon defendant denies us that luxu-
ry.1 
On August 10, 1984, defendant pled 
guilty to a charge of burglary, a third-
degree felony. On September 13, 1984, he 
was sentenced to a suspended prison term 
of zero to five years, and an eighteen-
month probation was imposed. The eigh-
teen-month period following imposition of 
sentence expired on March 13, 1986. The 
intent and effect of that probation order 
poses the crucial question in this appeal. 
Four days after the order was entered, the 
court ordered defendant's extradition to 
New Mexico to face pending criminal 
charges. In October, defendant was es-
corted to New Mexico, where he remained 
in custody for several months, until the 
New Mexico charges were dismissed. 
On January 9, 1985, while defendant was 
still in custody in New Mexico, the Utah 
Office of Adult Probation and Parole (AP 
& P) filed an incident report with the court, 
informing the court that defendant failed 
to report to his probation officer. Un-
aware of defendant's excellent excuse for 
not meeting with his probation officer in 
Moreover, the state has not sought dismissal of 
the appeal on this basis, as proposed in the 
dissent. See Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474 
(Utah 1981). The instant case is readily distin-
guishable from Hardy. Moya never escaped 
custody in Utah. Whether or not defendant is 
now absent from supervision is irrelevant, since 
we hold that parole supervision over him termi-
nated by operation of law long before his al-
leged fugitive status arose. 
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Utah, i.e., that Utah authorities had escort-
ed him to New Mexico where he remained 
in custody, AP & P requested that a no-
bail, nationwide arrest warrant be issued 
for defendant, which the court authorized. 
On April 17, 1985, after learning of defen-
dant's extradition to and custody in New 
Mexico, AP & P requested that the nation-
wide warrant be withdrawn and a "domes-
tic/' i.e., statewide, warrant be substituted. 
A few weeks later, the court withdrew the 
nationwide warrant and issued another 
warrant, authorizing defendant's arrest 
only if he was found in Utah. 
Defendant was released from custody in 
New Mexico and shortly thereafter, on Au-
gust 8, 1985, perpetrated a forgery in New 
Mexico. On September 23, 1986, he pled 
guilty to forgery and was granted proba-
tion by the New Mexico court in lieu of 
further incarceration. Defendant managed 
to estrange himself from the courts for the 
next two years, until AP & P learned of his 
return to Utah. On October 21, 1988, over 
four years after sentencing on the burglary 
conviction, and two and one-half years af-
ter defendant's Utah probation term had 
seemingly expired, AP & P filed its first 
affidavit in support of an order to show 
cause, seeking to revoke defendant's proba-
tion on the grounds defendant had failed to 
execute a probation agreement, failed to 
appear for probation, and failed to com-
plete restitution payments.2 AP & P filed 
an amended affidavit upon learning of de-
fendant's forgery conviction in New Mexi-
co. The amended affidavit also alleged 
commission of a burglary in Utah during 
the summer of 1988. 
At a hearing on the order to show cause 
to revoke defendant's probation, held on 
November 10, 1988, the court stated it was 
revoking defendant's probation for the rea-
2. Defendant claims that AP & P*s tardy filing 
was improper under law which was clearly es-
tablished at the time the action seeking proba-
tion revocation was commenced. State v. 
Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988). Because 
we reverse and vacate the order stemming from 
that filing on other grounds, we do not reach 
this claim. 
3. Utah R.Civ.P. 81(e) provides that the Rules of 
Civil Procedure "shall also govern in any aspect 
of criminal proceedings when there is no other 
sons stated in AP & P's amended affidavit, 
and reimposed the original prison term. 
Defendant was committed to the Utah 
State Prison, where he remained until Feb-
ruary 16, 1989, when he was extradited for 
a second time to New Mexico. On Febru-
ary 3, 1990, defendant was granted parole 
on the initial Utah burglary charge. De-
fendant's parole period remains in effect 
through November of this year. Defen-
dant's alleged violation of probation in New 
Mexico, subsequent commission of a bur-
glary in Utah, and his probationary status 
in Utah remain unresolved. 
Defendant continues to challenge the 
revocation of his Utah probation, claiming 
revocation was improper as the probation 
period had long since terminated by its own 
terms before probation was purportedly re-
voked. Meanwhile, on July 7, 1990, the 
trial court granted the state's motion seek-
ing an order under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(a)3 to 
"correct a clerical error" in the original 
sentence. Defendant's sentence thereafter 
clearly stated that the commencement and 
conditions of probation were to have been 
stayed pending defendant's return from 
New Mexico. Nonetheless, it is not alto-
gether clear when, if ever, this revised 
order would have started his Utah proba-
tionary period of eighteen months, al-
though the state suggested at oral argu-
ment it would not begin until defendant 
returned to Utah and signed a probation 
agreement. 
IMPOSITION AND TOLLING 
OF PROBATION 
[1] Defendant claims probation was 
originally imposed at sentencing on Sep-
tember 13, 1984. Defendant points out 
that unless it was imposed at that time, AP 
applicable statute or rule." An order under 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(a) is the proper device for 
correcting inaccuracies in the memorializing of 
civil judgments. However, Utah R.Crim.P. 
30(b), nearly textually identical to Utah R.Civ.P. 
60(a), would have been the more appropriate 
vehicle to employ in this case. Because we hold 
the substantive sentencing order to be error, 
review of an order based on either rule results 
in the same conclusion. 
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g, p*s concerns over his not reporting for 
probation, its securing warrants as a re-
sult, and its ultimate efforts to have proba-
tion revoked would be quite anomalous. 
Given AP & P's course of conduct, defen-
dant suggests the state should not now be 
heard to contend that probation was not 
"really" imposed at the time of sentencing. 
Defendant maintains that the court lost 
probation jurisdiction eighteen months af-
ter initial imposition of his sentence by 
operation of law.4 
While conceding before this court that 
probation was imposed, effective upon the 
entry of sentence, the state counters that 
probation was never executed, arguing 
both that the court stayed probation and 
that defendant failed to sign a probation 
agreement.5 Although the trial court later 
purported to dissolve the stay and impose 
probation, the state argues before this 
court that defendant remains subject to a 
full eighteen-month term of probation on 
the original burglary charge until he 
presents himself before AP & P officials 
and signs a probation agreement.6 Ac-
knowledging the conceptual difficulty of a 
parolee being placed on probation concern-
ing the very charge which landed him in 
prison, the state asks that the order revok-
ing defendant's probation be reversed and 
4. Relying on In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 
(1903), defendant also argues that the court lost 
jurisdiction when it effectively suspended his 
incarceration indefinitely by withdrawing the 
nationwide arrest warrant and substituting a 
domestic warrant. Defendant claims he was 
free from incarceration as long as he remained 
outside Utah, or while in Utah, avoided arrest. 
Because we hold the court had no jurisdiction 
upon expiration of the probation period stated 
in the court's initial order, we do not reach this 
5. The subtle distinction argued by the state re-
volves on whether probation was "stayed" at the 
time of imposition. The state now claims that 
the trial court imposed probation, but then im-
mediately stayed the execution of probation and 
argues that the stay was never lifted. We ad-
dress this argument as it relates to the Rule 
60(a) order, infra. 
6. The defendant also argues that insofar as the 
court relied on the tolling provision of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (Interim Supp. 
1984), such reliance was error and tolling did 
not apply. See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 
the case remanded for execution of proba-
tion. 
At the time defendant was sentenced, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim 
Supp. 1984) provided: 
Upon completion without violation of 18 
months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in 
class B misdemeanor cases, the offender 
shall be terminated from sentence and 
the supervision of the Division of Correc-
tions, unless the person is earlier termi-
nated by the court. 
This same provision was recently con-
strued by the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988). The 
Court stated that the Legislature holds the 
power to fix the limits of sentencing and 
probation. The statute establishes eigh-
teen months as the normal maximum limit 
for probation in a felony case. The trial 
court's discretion to revoke probation may 
only be exercised within that limitation and 
upon following a particular procedure.7 
See Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 790-91 
(Utah 1990); Green, 757 P.2d at 464. See 
also State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah 
CtApp.), cert denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 
1989). In Green, the defendant committed 
a violation prior to the expiration of his 
probationary period. However, the action 
to revoke Green's probation was not com-
(Utah 1988). Although the state relied primarily 
on the tolling argument below, it has aban-
doned that position on appeal. Thus, the state 
is not contending that the initial incident report 
or the related domestic warrant tolled the expi-
ration of the 18-month probationary period. 
Its point is that the 18-month period had not 
started to run when defendant was first sen-
tenced. The state fails to explain how the inci-
dent report claiming a probation violation could 
have been properly filed or the related warrant 
properly issued if probation had not yet even 
commenced. 
7. That procedure includes filing and service of 
an affidavit of probation violation prior to the 
time the probationary period has expired. See 
Green, 757 P.2d at 464; Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(9) (1990). Probation may not be retroac-
tively revoked no matter how clear it subse-
quently appears that probation requirements 
were not followed, where no enforcement ac-
tion is taken prior to the elapse of the term of 
probation. 
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menced until several months after the pro-
bationary period ended. 
The Court held that the probationary pe-
riod for a felony terminated by operation of 
law eighteen months after imposition, ab-
sent commencement of an action to extend 
or revoke probation filed within the proba-
tionary period.8 Rejecting the state's argu-
ment that probation was tolled by the mere 
commission of a violation of probation 
terms, the Court stated: 
The statute requires that the offender 
"shall" be terminated from sentence if 
eighteen-months' probation is completed 
without violation. This strong mandate 
is not consistent with the State's position 
that the eighteen-month term is "tolled" 
when any violation occurs within the pe-
riod This construction would obvi-
ate the certainty and regularity created 
by the statute and ignore the plain mean-
ing of the word "terminate." 
Green, 757 P.2d at 464. The statute under 
which defendant's probation was imposed 
simply does not contemplate tolling upon 
violation of probation terms where the vio-
lation is not properly acted upon in timely 
fashion.9 We therefore hold that, unless 
the Rule 60(a) modification dictates another 
8. In Green, the Court reserved the question of 
how far a probation revocation or modification 
action must proceed before the expiration of the 
18 month period. However, in Smith the Court 
stated that a probationer who is not attempting 
to evade probation officers must be served with 
notice of the action within the probation period. 
803 P.2d at 793. In this case, the incident re-
port was filed within 18 months from defen-
dant's original sentence; it was not served on 
defendant. The order to show cause on which 
the trial court ultimately acted was not even 
issued until two and one half years after the 18 
months had expired. It alleged probation viola-
tions other than the one alleged in the incident 
report. Indeed, it alleged violations which oc-
curred beyond the 18-month period. 
9. In arguing that his probation expired eighteen 
months after imposition, defendant also notes 
that the state could have sought continuation of 
his probation by merely filing appropriate mo-
tions and affidavits within the proper time. The 
state has chosen not to respond to this and 
related arguments, relying instead on the trial 
court's subsequent revision of defendant's sen-
tence. Ignoring AP & P*s prior conduct suggest-
ing probation started upon entry of sentence, 
i.e., its early incident report, the state endeavors 
result, the trial court's jurisdiction over 
defendant terminated at the end of the 
eighteen-month probation period. See 
notes 6 & 8, supra, 
RULE 60(A) CORRECTION 
OF CLERICAL ERROR 
[2] The state relies entirely on the trial 
court's Rule 60(a) order correcting the ter-
minology of defendant's probation sentence 
to support its position that probation may 
have been imposed, but was never exe-
cuted.10 The state claims that probation 
was ordered "nunc pro tunc" on July 3, 
1990, the date of the court's announcement 
of the Rule 60(a) order revising defendant's 
sentence, which was signed on July 26, 
1990. The state further asserts that proba-
tion has still not yet:6een actually imposed 
because defendant has not yet returned to 
Utah for execution of probation, despite 
the fact that defendant has been incarcer-
ated, granted parole, and released—all on 
the ground he violated the probation which 
was only very recently imposed "nunc pro 
tunc." n 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) pro-
vides: "Clerical mistakes in judgments . . . 
to move the starting date of defendant's proba-
tion forward in time. Its dilemma lies in artic-
ulating a theory that would both validate defen-
dant's incarceration in late 1988 for probation 
violation and demonstrate that he is still subject 
to a term of probation that has not yet been 
executed. 
10. The state's principal brief, while praise-
worthy in its inclusion of pertinent citation to 
and quotation from the record, devotes only 
passing attention to defendant's primary argu-
ments. The state relies almost exclusively on its 
position that each of defendant's arguments is 
moot when viewed with the benefit of the Rule 
60(a) order revising defendant's original sen-
tence. 
11. In light of this extraordinary circumstance 
under the state's own view—a defendant repos-
ing at the Utah State Prison for violation of 
probation which was ordered long after his pa-
role and has yet to be imposed, i.e., executed— 
we believe that the state strains for a Latin gnat 
Truly, the state's claim is not that the sentence 
was imposed "nunc pro tunc;" rather, the state s 
position reflects a "tunc pro nunc" reality. See 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 n. 1 (Utah 
1981) (explaining "nunc pro tunc" in a similar 
context). 
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arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time " 
Neither defendant nor the state contests 
that the substantive purpose of Rule 60(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
limited to curing errors in accurately me-
morializing a judgment Substantive 
modifications to address subsequent devel-
opments are not authorized under Rule 
60(a). We review Rule 60(a) orders under 
an abuse of discretion standard. See Lind-
say v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant maintains that the Rule 60(a) 
order was inappropriate because no "cleri-
cal" error existed in the court's original 
judgment and sentence. See Richards v. 
Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 
145 (1970) (rule allowing correction of cleri-
cal error does not provide for a judgment 
to be altered to state other than what the 
court intended to pronounce); State v. Den-
ney, 776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1989) (unambig-
uous criminal order cannot be later mod-
ified to match "what the judge may have 
intended"). Defendant supports this con-
tention by repeating the argument that the 
same court which initially sentenced him to 
probation could not revoke probation which 
had not yet really been imposed. While 
this simple logic has obvious appeal, we 
nonetheless proceed with our review of the 
Rule 60(a) order as if its entry were a valid 
exercise of correcting a clerical error.12 
The revised sentence, entered on July 26, 
1990, states that 
Defendant is granted a stay of the sen-
tence and placed on probation in the cus-
tody of this Court under the supervision 
12. The very nature of a Rule 60(a) order sug-
gests validity—the judge who initially pro-
nounced judgment is merely restating his or her 
intent in order that it might be accurately re-
flected in the written record. Deferential re-
view of the propriety of Rule 60(a) orders would 
be inappropriate, however, if the record unam-
biguously expressed a judgment contrary to that 
stated in the Rule 60(a) order of clerical revi-
sion. See Denney, 776 P.2d at 93. 
13. At least in terms of defendant's first post-
sentence return from New Mexico, even this 18 
month period had already expired at the time 
the court "clarified" defendant's sentence. De-
fendant had returned to Utah at least by Novem-
ber 10, 1988, at which time he was incarcerated 
at the Utah State Prison for violation of proba-
UtahRep 815-819 P 2d—4 
of the Chief Agent, Utah State Depart-
ment of Adult Parole for a period of 18 
months, said conditions of probation to 
be stayed until defendant is returned 
from New Mexico.13 
As the Green Court noted, the Legisla-
ture proclaimed a "strong mandate" that 
probation shall terminate upon the expira-
tion of the eighteen-month term, unless the 
state successfully seeks revocation or ex-
tension of probation within the appropriate 
period. Green, 757 P.2d at 464. Just as 
the Supreme Court in Green found auto-
matic tolling of probation to be inconsistent 
with that strong mandate, id., we find im-
position of a stay of probation to be equally 
inconsistent. Cf. Denney, 776 P.2d at 92-
93 (even though court may have intended 
to impose two eighteen-month probation 
periods, probation terminated by operation 
of law eighteen months after imposition, 
absent extension, revocation or unambig-
uously-stated consecutive terms of proba-
tion for different offenses). The result es-
chewed in Green, that defendant could be 
potentially exposed to an indefinite proba-
tionary term, would similarly be present 
where imposition of probation was indeter-
minately stayed.14 Such a construction 
"would obviate the certainty and regularity 
created by the [probation] statute." 
Green, 757 P.2d at 464. 
Finally, we note that defendant's proba-
tion, whether actually imposed or not, was 
revoked and defendant actually served time 
in prison for the original offense on the 
basis that he had violated probation. After 
tion, which, in the court's later view, had not yet 
been imposed, or at least executed. 
14. The potential for abuse is obvious. A court 
could impose a probationary term of 18 months, 
with execution stayed for 10 years unless defen-
dant should earlier violate conditions of the 
stay, which could simply track the provisions of 
probation. Such a defendant would be subject 
to an W/i year de facto probation, a result 
clearly at odds with the pronouncements of our 
Legislature and Supreme Court. 
Such potential for abuse is not present where 
a sentence which includes probation is stayed 
pending appeal, and nothing stated in this opin-
ion about probation and stays has applicability 
to that more straightforward situation. 
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a term of incarceration, defendant was 
granted parole and released from prison 
under the supervision of parole agents. 
Once a person is subjected to the strong 
grasp of the law through parole it is incon-
sistent with the order of the system to 
reach out with yet another arm of the law 
and impose supervision under a probation 
scheme, which is essentially a pre-incarcer-
ation measure, not a post-release adjunct to 
parole supervision. Once the state has the 
parole "hook" in a defendant's life, further 
supervisory entanglement is somewhat su-
perfluous.15 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that defendant's probation ter-
minated eighteen months following imposi-
tion, which occurred at the time of initial 
sentencing. The state's efforts to comply 
with statutory provisions for revoking or 
extending defendant's probation were not 
timely. Accordingly, the Rule 60(a) order 
is vacated and defendant's probation and 
parole are extinguished.16 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
I would dismiss this appeal. 
In State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stat-
ed that "under the settled rule of Hardy v. 
Morris, Utah, 636 P.2d 473 (1981) [,] . . . 
one who escapes places himself beyond the 
reach of the judicial system and any ruling 
cannot be enforced against him; therefore, 
he should not be allowed to pursue an 
appeal while out of custody." It is undis-
15. Under parole supervision, and subject to cer-
tain conditions, an offender may be immediate-
ly reincarcerated for a violation of parole terms, 
which may or may not be an independent viola-
tion of state law. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 
(1990). Probation supervision provides for 
comparatively less swift detention for violation 
of the probation agreement, requiring a show-
ing of cause and a judicial hearing. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (1990). 
16. The probation purportedly imposed years af-
ter entry of the initial sentence is vacated be-
cause defendant's actual period of probation 
had expired 18 months after initial sentence. 
Parole is terminated because it grew out of a 
puted that Moya is presently a fugitive 
from the criminal justice system. Because 
Moya has placed himself beyond the reach 
of the judicial system, his appeal should be 
dismissed. 
My colleagues erroneously proceed to de-
cide Moya's appeal. This error is com-
pounded by their holding that Moya's pro-
bation expired by its own terms eighteen 
months after the initial sentencing in Sep-
tember, 1984. The obvious flaw in the 
majority's analysis is that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp.1984) did 
not unconditionally and automatically ter-
minate any and all probationary periods at 
eighteen months. Section 77-18-l(10)(a) 
clearly stated that its effect was limited to 
those cases where the probationer did not 
violate probation. In the present case, 
Moya violated his probation, an incident 
report was filed by AP & P, and a bench 
warrant was issued; therefore, the eigh-
teen-month limitation was tolled. See 
Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990). 
As a practical matter, I fear the majori-
ty's holding in this case will encourage 
other probationers to abscond until the 
statutory time after sentencing has 
elapsed. The probationers may thereby be 
free from the threat of incarceration and 
all conditions attached to their probation. 
This bizarre possibility will, in turn, lead 
trial courts not to even consider probation 
as an alternative at sentencing. 
term of imprisonment which was imposed for 
probation violations not acted upon prior to the 
expiration of probation. Since defendant had 
no probation to violate at that time, he had no 
probation to revoke and should not have gone 
to prison on that basis. Had he not gone to 
prison, he would have not been paroled. 
The author senses being guilty in this case of 
"making the easy ones look hard," and fears 
that our labors at scholarly discussion, against a 
bizarre factual background, may promote more 
bewilderment than understanding. In simplest 
terms, our holding is this: There is no such 
thing as going to prison for violating conditions 
of probation which did not come into existence 
until release from prison on parole. 
L. Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986) 
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failed to establish fraud in this case, and in 
the absence of fraud the merger doctrine 
applies. Therefore we affirm the judgment 
of no cause of action against the Petersons, 
and we uphold the injunction ordered by 
the trial court. 
[3] Finally, the Knights have appealed 
from the dismissal of the breach of fiduci-
ary duty action against Guardian Title. 
The trial court found no fiduciary relation-
ship existed between the Knights and 
Guardian, and our review of the record 
indicates ample evidentiary support for 
that finding. We therefore also affirm the 
dismissal of the action against Guardian 
Title Company. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
TERRACOR, a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS & 
FORESTRY, George Buzianis, Chair-
man of the Utah Board of State Lands 
& Forestry, the Utah Division of State 
Lands & Forestry, Ralph Miles, Di-
rector of the Division of State Lands & 
Forestry, Utah Department of Natural 
Resources, Temple A. Reynolds, Execu-
tive Director of the Utah Department of 
Natural Resources, Bloomington Knolls 
Association, a Utah nonprofit associa-
tion, Joseph E. Jones, Roy Hardy, prin-
cipals of Bloomington Knolls Associa-
tion, Defendants. 
No. 20270. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 7, 1986. 
Firm which had sought to exchange 
property it held for school lands held by 
Board of State Lands and Forestry sought 
mandamus following Board's decision to 
lease the property to another firm, alleging 
that the lease procedures were contrary to 
state law. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that the firm lacked standing. 
Petition denied. 
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion in 
which Durham, J., concurred. 
1. Parties <3=>76(3) 
Supreme Court could raise issue of a 
party's standing to bring a petition to chal-
lenge legality of lease of property by state 
land board sua sponte, regardless of par-
ties' failure to raise or address the ques-
tion. 
2. Mandamus <s=»22 
Petitioner for extraordinary relief 
must have standing, just as any other liti-
gant must. 
3. Action @=>13 
Supreme Court will not lightly dis-
pense with requirement that litigant have a 
personal stake in outcome of a specific 
dispute. Const. Art. 5, § 1. 
4. Action <§=>13 
General standards for determining 
whether a litigant has standing are: that 
plaintiff be able to show that he has suf-
fered some distinct and palpable injury, 
that, if plaintiff does not have standing 
under this criterion, he may have standing 
if no one else has greater interest in out-
come and issues are unlikely to be raised at 
all unless that particular plaintiff had 
standing to raise issue and, even if stand-
ing is not found under the first two crite-
ria, plaintiff may nonetheless have stand-
ing if issues are unique and of such great 
public importance that they ought to be 
decided in furtherance of public interest. 
Const. Art. 5, § 1. 
5. Mandamus <§=>23(1) 
Firm which had sought to exchange 
property with Board of State Lands and 
Forestry for 
lacked standing to seek mandamus to chal-
lenge Board's subsequent decision to lease 
the property due to existence of potential 
plaintiffs with a more direct interest where 
firm specifically conceded that challenge 
was not based on failure to accept the 
proposal, but on procedures used. Const. 
Art. 5; U.C.A.1953, 65-1-68; Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 65B(b)(3); Rules App.Proc, 
Rule 19. 
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purpose of developing it alleges that (1) the Board violated U.C.A., 
1953, § 65-1-68,2 which permits the Board 
to sell subdivided school trust lands by 
public auction but does not allow the Board 
to dispose of such lands by negotiated leas-
es; and (2) the Board breached its fiduciary 
responsibility to obtain the highest possible 
return from school trust lands by issuing 
SULA 593 without competitive bidding. 
Terracor claims that extraordinary relief is 
necessary because it has no plain and ade-
quate remedy at law since section 65-1-9,3 
which provides for appeals from some 
kinds of Board decisions, does not express-
ly state that appeals should be to the dis-
trict court and that under decisions of this 
Court it is not clear whether this Court or 
the district court is the proper forum for an 
appeal in the first instance. Terracor also 
claims extraordinary relief is appropriate 
because the language of section 65-1-68 is 
clear and mandatory, and under Archer v. 
Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 
392 P.2d 622, 623 (1964), and Hamblin v. 
State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 
Utah 402, 187 P. 178 (1919), as well as Rule 
65B, mandamus is an appropriate remedy 
where a public agency or official has violat-
ed a clear duty mandated by statute. The 
defendants counter that extraordinary re-
Peter W. Billings, Jr., Denise A. Dragoo, 
Rosemary J. Beless, Michelle Mitchell, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Anne M. 
Stirba, Asst. Atty. Gen., Clark Arnold, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(3) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure,1 the plaintiff, Ter-
racor, petitions this Court for extraordi-
nary relief in the nature of a writ of man-
damus, directing the Board of State Lands 
and Forestry and the Division of State 
Lands and Forestry to rescind a special use 
lease ("SULA 593") issued by the Board to 
Bloomington Knolls Association. Terracor 
1. Terracor's petition was filed with this Court 
October 29, 1984. A petition for extraordinary 
writ to a judge or agency filed with this Court 
after January 1, 1985, would be governed by 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. 
2. Section 65-1-68 states: 
Any portion of the public lands of this state 
not occupied by bona fide settlers having pref-
erence right of purchase, may be subdivided 
into lots, and sold as provided in this chapter, 
the board first being satisfied that by a subdi-
vision of any tract into lots a sale of the same 
can be made for a greater amount than if sold 
in legal subdivisions. The board may survey 
such tracts and direct their subdivision. A 
plat of the survey shall be filed in the office of 
the county recorder of the county wherein the 
land is situated, and a copy in the office of the 
board. Tracts so subdivided shall not be sub-
ject to lease, but each lot shall be sold at 
public auction at such times as the board may 
direct. The manner of appraisement and sale 
of such subdivided lands shall be in all re-
spects the same as in the case of other lands 
sold. 
3. Section 65-1-9 states: 
(1) Where contests arise as to the prefer-
ence rights of claimants for lands under the 
control of the board, it shall have full power 
to hold a hearing thereon and to direct the 
taking of evidence concerning the questions 
involved, which hearing shall be reported in 
full. The board shall make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, enter its order with 
respect thereto, and notify the parties to such 
hearing of its findings, conclusions and order. 
(2) No claimant for lands under control of 
the board can appeal for judicial review of a 
decision of the board involving any sale, 
lease, or disposition of state lands, or any 
action relating thereto, unless such claimant 
files a written protest with respect thereto 
with the board within ninety days after the 
final decision of the board relating to such 
matter; or, with respect to decisions rendered 
prior to the effective date of this act, within 
ninety days after such effective date. This 
provision shall not relate to disputes between 
the board and any party as to the ownership 
or title to any lands. 
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lief is improper because Terracor only 
seeks clarification of an unclear statute 
and that Terracor had a plain and adequate 
legal remedy by means of an appeal under 
section 65-1-9. Since we deny Terracor's 
petition for an extraordinary writ because 
it lacks standing, we do not decide these 
issues. 
In late 1983 or early 1984, Terracor ap-
proached the State Land Board and sought 
to acquire the 10.9-acre parcel of land at 
issue by exchanging an equivalent amount 
of property that Terracor owned. Some 
time after that, Bloomington Knolls applied 
to the Land Board to lease the same 10.9 
acres, with the intention of subdividing the 
parcel for development as homesites. The 
Board notified Terracor of the competing 
proposal and explained that to make the 
land exchange acceptable Terracor would 
have to offer more land in exchange, or 
land of a greater value, since the land 
Terracor had offered would not be develo-
pable for several years. The Board also 
notified Terracor that approval of the lease 
to Bloomington Knolls would, in effect, 
constitute a rejection of Terracor's propos-
al. Terracor did nothing more toward ne-
gotiating an exchange. In May, 1984, the 
Board leased the 10.9 acres of school trust 
land to Bloomington Knolls. 
Terracor protested the Land Board's 
leasing procedure on the ground that it 
was contrary to state law and that it would 
result in unfair competition. On Septem-
ber 18, 1984, the Board ruled that Terracor 
had waived its right to protest by doing 
nothing to indicate a continuing interest in 
the land after being informed of Blooming-
ton Knolls' proposal. The Board also ruled 
that its procedures were in compliance with 
state law and that it had not violated its 
fiduciary responsibilities with respect to 
the administration of state school trust 
lands by leasing the disputed parcel pursu-
ant to a negotiated lease rather than by 
auction. 
Terracor then filed this petition for ex-
traordinary relief directly in this Court. 
Terracor does not assert in this action that 
the Board erred in refusing Terracor's pro-
posed exchange. Indeed, in its "Petition 
for Relief Under Rule 65B(b)(3)" filed in 
this Court, Terracor admits that it does not 
now challenge the granting of the lease to 
Bloomington Knolls rather than to it. 
Thus, the action in this Court is not based 
on Terracor's losing out to Bloomington 
Knolls for the parcel in question. Rather, 
Terracor asserts only that the Board violat-
ed state law by leasing rather than selling 
the parcel in question and violated its fidu-
ciary duty to maximize the return on all 
school trust lands by negotiating a lease of 
a portion of those lands rather than requir-
ing competitive bidding. It is noteworthy 
that Terracor's aborted efforts to acquire 
the land were based on the same type of 
negotiated procedure that it now alleges is 
illegal. 
[1,2] The parties have not raised or 
addressed the question of Terracor's stand-
ing to bring this petition to challenge the 
legality of the Land Board's lease. How-
ever, this Court may address that issue sua 
sponte. Utah Restaurant Association v. 
Dams County Board of Health, Utah, 709 
P.2d 1159 (1985); Heath Tecna Corp. v. 
Sound Systems International, Inc., Utah, 
588 P.2d 169, 170 (1978). A petitioner for 
extraordinary relief must have standing, 
just as any other litigant must have. See, 
e.g., Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 329, 336, 
203 P. 637, 640-41 (1921); Crockett v. 
Board of Education, 58 Utah 303, 309, 199 
P. 158, 160 (1921). 
[3] The doctrine of standing is intended 
to assure the procedural integrity of judi-
cial adjudications by requiring that the par-
ties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest 
in the subject matter of the dispute and 
sufficient adverseness that the legal and 
factual issues which must be resolved will 
be thoroughly explored. Unlike federal 
law where standing doctrine is related to 
the "case or controversy" language of Arti-
cle III of the United States Constitution, 
our standing law arises from the general 
precepts of the doctrine of separation of 
powers found in Article V of the Utah 
Constitution. Under Utah law, the doc-
trine of standing operates as gatekeeper to 
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allowing in only those cott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, the courthouse, m
cases that are fit for judicial resolution. 
Important jurisprudential considerations 
dictate that courts confine themselves to 
resolution of those disputes most effective-
ly resolved through the judicial process, 
i.e., crystalized disputes concerning specific 
factual situations. Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 
(1968); Jenkins v. Swan, Utah, 675 P.2d 
1145, 1149 (1983). Thus, the doctrine of 
standing limits judicial power so that there 
will not "be a significant inroad on the 
representative form of government, 
castpng] the courts in the role of supervis-
ing the coordinate branches of government 
. . . [and converting] the judiciary into an 
open forum for the resolution of political 
and ideological disputes about the perform-
ance of government." Baird v. State, 
Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (1978). See also 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 
188-92, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2952-54, 41 L.Ed.2d 
678 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). For 
this reason, this Court will not lightly dis-
pense with the requirement that a litigant 
have a personal stake in the outcome of a 
specific dispute. Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 
675 P.2d at 1150; see also Stromquist v. 
Cokayne, Utah, 646 P.2d 746, 747 (1982); 
Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289, 
290 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 
P.2d 442, 443 (1978); Sears v. Ogden City, 
Utah, 572 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1977). Never-
theless, it is difficult to make useful, all-in-
clusive generalizations that determine 
whether standing exists in any given case, 
since the issue often depends on the facts 
of each case. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 702 P.2d 451, 453 
(1985); Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 151, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 
184 (1970). 
[4] This Court has referred to three 
general standards for determining whether 
a litigant has standing.4 Jenkins v. Swan, 
supra, 675 P.2d at 1150; see also Kenne-
4. In addition, taxpayers may have standing to 
challenge an illegal expenditure. E.g., Lyon v. 
Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 (1951); 
supra, 702 P.2d at 454. The premise upon 
which these standards have been construct-
ed is that issues should generally be litigat-
ed by those parties with the most direct 
interest in resolution of those issues, al-
though in some cases a party who does not 
have the most immediate or direct interest 
may have standing. 
The first general criterion is that the 
"[p]laintiff must be able to show that he 
has suffered some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him a personal stake in 
the outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins 
v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 1148. See also 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, supra, 702 P.2d at 454; Strom-
quist v. Cokayne, supra, 646 P.2d at 747; 
Sears v. Ogden City, supra, 572 P.2d at 
1362; Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 866 (1975); 
Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 337, 342 n.7, 411 P.2d 831, 834 n.7 
(1966); State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504, 
94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939) (must be personally 
affected by operation of statute to attack 
its validity). 
Second, if a plaintiff does not have stand-
ing under the first criterion, he may have 
standing if no one else has a greater inter-
est in the outcome of the case and the 
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless 
that particular plaintiff has standing to 
raise the issue. Kennecott Copper Corp. 
v. Salt Lake County, supra, 702 P.2d at 
454; Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 
1150. See also Startup v. Harmon, 59 
Utah 329, 336, 203 P. 637, 640-41 (1921); 
Crockett v. Board of Education, 58 Utah 
303, 309, 199 P. 158, 160 (1921). 
Third, even though standing is not found 
to exist under the first two criteria, a plain-
tiff may nonetheless have standing if the 
issues are unique and of such great public 
importance that they ought to be decided in 
furtherance of the public interest. Jenkins 
v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 1150; Jenkins 
Tooele Building Association v. Tooele High 
School District, 43 Utah 362, 134 P. 894 (1913). 
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v. Finlinson, supra, 607 P.2d at 290; Jen-
kins v. State, supra, 585 P.2d at 443. 
[5] Terracor meets none of these re-
quirements. It has not alleged any "par-
ticularized injury to [itself] by virtue of 
the claimed wrong." Jenkins v. Swan, 
supra, 675 P.2d at 1151 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Terracor's proposed exchange of land 
for the tract which was subsequently 
leased to Bloomington Knolls by SULA 593 
does not provide a valid basis for standing 
since Terracor has specifically conceded in 
its pleadings that its challenge is not based 
on the Board's failure to accept that pro-
posal. Indeed, Terracor does not assert 
that its proposal was of greater value or 
advantage to the State than Bloomington 
Knolls' proposal. In fact, Terracor's own 
proposal for a negotiated exchange was 
wholly inconsistent with the position it now 
asserts that such lands can only be dis-
posed of by public auction. 
Terracor fares no better under the sec-
ond part of the Jenkins analysis. There 
are others who could raise the same chal-
lenges raised by Terracor, and who would 
have a greater, more direct interest in do-
ing so. For example, one who attempts to 
purchase the same school lands as another 
and loses out to the other would have 
standing if the basis of the action was the 
failure of the Board to lease to that partic-
ular person rather than the competition to 
one's business or a result of a lease to 
another party. Furthermore, beneficiaries 
of the school trust land would no doubt 
have standing to assert a violation of the 
Board's fiduciary responsibility to maxim-
ize the return from school trust lands. 
Thus, the State Treasurer, who receives 
20% of all monies collected by the Division 
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 65-1-13, and 
possibly the Attorney General, would have 
standing to assert a violation by the Board 
of its legal and fiduciary responsibilities. 
Since there are "other potential plaintiffs 
with a more direct interest" in the issues m 
this case, we decline to reach the third test, 
whether the public importance of the issues 
raised is so great that they ought to be 
litigated in any event. Jenkins v. Swan, 
supra, 675 P.2d at 1151. 
Since Terracor does not have standing, 
we do not address the question whether 
Terracor has an adequate remedy at law by 
way of an appeal under section 65-1-9. 
Petition denied. No costs. 
HALL, C.J., and SCOTT DANIELS, Dis-
trict Judge, concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, sat. 
HOWE, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent from what I perceive to be a 
very narrow application of the rules of 
"standing" to the plaintiff. The Land 
Board had before it two competing propos-
als. Terracor's proposal was to exchange 
land. Bloomington Knolls' proposal was to 
lease the state land and subdivide it for 
home sites. The Board rejected Terracor's 
proposal and accepted the proposal of 
Bloomington Knolls'. Terracor protested 
to the Board, and now protests to this 
Court, that the Board has no statutory 
authority to lease state lands and that in so 
doing unfair competition resulted. 
The majority concedes that "one who at-
tempts to purchase the same school lands 
as another and loses out to the other per-
son, would have standing." Yet the major-
ity holds that Terracor has no standing 
even though it was attempting to acquire 
the same lands as its competitor Blooming-
ton Knolls but proposed to do so by ex-
change rather than by leasing. Why that 
difference should destroy Terracor's stand-
ing completely eludes me. The majority 
seems to find comfort in the fact that Ter-
racor declined the Board's invitation to 
make its proposal more attractive. Terra-
cor, thereafter, the majority argues, had no 
interest and lacked standing to question 
what the Board did with the land. I cannot 
subscribe to this reasoning. In the first 
place, Terracor's rejection came simulta-
neous with Bloomington Knolls' accept-
ance. The rejection and the acceptance 
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were not separated by a period of time. 
Secondly, the interest of a competitor does 
not necessarily dissipate when its proposal 
is rejected. It remains interested in what 
the Board does thereafter with the land, 
especially when, as alleged here, the Board 
disposes of it in an alleged unlawful trans-
action which should be set aside and the 
land restored to the Board. 
The majority endeavors to find support 
for its holding that Terracor lacks standing 
because "Terracor does not assert in this 
action that the Board erred in refusing 
Terracor's proposed exchange." That ar-
gument leads nowhere. Of course, the 
Board has discretion in choosing proposals 
before it. Neither Terracor nor any other 
competitor could validly argue that the 
Board was obliged to accept its proposal. 
However, what Terracor is contending for 
is that the Board accepted a proposal which 
it could not lawfully do. When unlawful 
proposals are removed from consideration 
by the Board, the Board is left to reconsid-
er the remaining proposals. Furthermore, 
as long as the land remains in the hands of 
the Board, a competitor is afforded the 
continuing opportunity to "sweeten" his 
proposal. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HOWE, J. 
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Richard R. PETERSON, aka 
Richard Ross Peterson. 
No. 19784. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 11, 1986. 
Judgment creditor which, at best, had 
interest in contingent interest of one of 
beneficiaries of estate, sought to be joined 
in probate court proceedings as interested 
party. The Seventh District Court, San-
pete County, Don V. Tibbs, J., denied the 
motion to be joined. Judgment creditor 
appealed. The Supreme Court held that 
judgment creditor of estate beneficiary, 
which was not creditor of estate, and had 
no property right in or claim against estate, 
was not entitled to access to probate pro-
ceedings. 
Affirmed. 
1. Act ion <£=>3 
Where statute creates cause of action 
and designates those who may sue under it, 
none except those designated may sue. 
2. Wills <3=>872 
Judgment creditor of beneficiary of es-
tate, which was not creditor of estate and 
had no property right in or claim against 
estate, was not entitled to access to probate 
proceedings to reach assets of estate to 
satisfy judgment. U.C.A.1953, 75-1-201(4, 
20), 75-1-302, 75-3-1001(1). 
Stephen L. Johnston, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Dale O. Andersen, W. Andrew McCul-
lough, Orem, Thomas R. Patton, Provo, for 
respondent. 
Richard R. Peterson, Jr., pro se. 
PER CURIAM: 
Freed Leasing, Inc. (Freed) appeals from 
an order of the Sanpete County Probate 
Court denying its motion to be joined as an 
interested party. We affirm. 
Freed was a judgment creditor of Rich-
ard R. Peterson, Jr. (Peterson) against 
whom it had vainly tried to execute on a 
judgment. Peterson filed a homestead ex-
emption when Freed attempted to execute 
on his residence in Utah County. Peterson 
was also the informally appointed personal 
representative of the estate of Richard R. 
Peterson, Sr. (decedent) against whose es-
tate Freed next attempted to impose its lien 
